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THE MANY LANES OUT OF COURT: AGAINST PRIVATIZATION 
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 
THERESA M. BEINER 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After Congress enacted the first laws prohibiting employment 
discrimination in 1964,
1
 workplaces changed significantly.  No longer could 
employers segregate workplaces based on race or sex.
2
  In many 
workplaces, workers who had been separated now worked side by side.  
One only need board an airline flight to realize how law can transform jobs 
and workplaces.  Instead of seeing only the pretty, slim, young, unmarried 
“stewardesses” of the 1960s, it is not uncommon to have an entirely male 
flight attendant crew that includes workers over age fifty.
3
  Indeed, both the 
pilot and co-pilot on a commercial flight might well be women.  While this 
transformation in workplaces is one of Title VII’s key successes, in more 
recent years, scholars have lamented that employment discrimination laws 
have not proven effective in eliminating the many vestiges of 
discrimination in the workplace that still linger.
4
  Many scholars blame the 
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 1.  See Civil Rights Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 28 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)). 
 2.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (discussing unlawful employment practices, generally). 
 3.  Indeed, the three female flight attendants who helped the passengers off the US Airways 
flight 1549, which famously crashed into the Hudson River in 2009, were all in their fifties.  
Charlie Leocha, Unsung Heroes on the Hudson—Flight Attendants on US Airways 1549, 
CONSUMER TRAVELER, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.consumertraveler.com/today/unsung-heroes-
on-the-hudson-flight-attendants-on-us-airways-1549/.   
 4.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 764–72 
(2011) (describing difficulties plaintiffs face in “[s]econd-[g]eneration” employment 
discrimination cases); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 
(1995) (arguing “the way in which Title VII jurisprudence constructs discrimination, while 
sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination prevalent in an earlier age, is inadequate to 
address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy”); 
Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination 
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lackluster enforcement of employment discrimination laws on the federal 
courts’ inability to understand or theorize about the lingering aspects of 
discrimination based on race and sex that still pervade the modern 
workplace.
5
  In addition, some scholars have opined that the federal courts 
are hostile to employment discrimination claims and do not wish to hear 
them.
6
  This may lead one to believe that out-of-court processes might 
better serve the aims of anti-discrimination laws. 
This Article will argue the opposite: that there is a distinct need for 
employment discrimination cases to be tried in court before juries.  This 
Article charts the many processes the federal courts have used over the last 
twenty years to withdraw themselves from the employment discrimination 
                                                          
Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 194 (2009) 
(noting “[e]mployment discrimination laws in the United States have not created full equality in 
the workplace” and that “achieving full equality requires greater accountability for those who 
make employment decisions”); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An 
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 663, 667–69, 671–72 (2005) (outlining the current debates of whether there is too much, too 
little, or simply ineffective discrimination litigation); Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460–61 (2001) 
(describing difficulties plaintiffs have in Title VII cases involving more ingrained forms—or 
“second generation” forms—of discrimination).  Some debate exists about whether Title VII or 
economic factors resulted in gains made by women and members of minority groups.  See 
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 306–10 (1993) (concluding that Title VII did actively produce 
positive effects on “female employment opportunities”).  
 5.  See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. 
L. REV. 555, 556–57 (2001) (suggesting that courts are influenced by certain pervasive biases and 
the general misconception that anti-employment discrimination cases are easy to win). 
 6.  See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate 
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 958 
(2002) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia] (explaining that “[c]loser consideration 
of job discrimination cases strengthens an attitudinal explanation of the defendant/plaintiff 
differential”); see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 110 disp. 2, 
111, 112 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse] (noting that the 
approximately forty-one percent to nine percent spread in reversal rates on appeal between 
defendants and plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases is more extreme than the difference 
between plaintiff and defendant reversal rates in non-job cases); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 429, 442 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, How Employment Plaintiffs 
Fare] (citing statistics illustrating that “employment discrimination plaintiffs have won only 19.29 
percent of judge trials but 37.77 percent of jury trials”).  The difference in reversal rates on appeal 
is stark.  Reversal rates for defendants from plaintiff pretrial wins is thirty percent compared to a 
nearly eleven percent reversal rate for plaintiffs who appeal defendant pretrial wins.  The reversal 
rate from trial wins is forty-one percent for defendants when plaintiffs win at trial compared to 
nearly nine percent for plaintiffs when the defendant wins at trial.  Clermont & Schwab, From 
Bad to Worse, supra, at 110 disp. 2. 
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business.
7
  In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
opened the door to alternative forms of dispute resolution in order to “get 
rid of” these cases.8  Whether it be through a robust pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence, an uncalled-for reliance on employer internal grievance 
mechanisms, or aggressive settlement conferences, courts are shunting 
employment discrimination cases out of the court system and into the 
sphere of private dispute resolution.
9
  Notably, the courts are not the only 
movers of this trend; even the federal agency tasked with enforcing these 
laws—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)—is 
finding means other than court cases for addressing these claims.
10
  In 
addition, lower courts have used invigorated civil procedure rules, including 
summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss, as an effective tool to 
clear their dockets, leaving plaintiffs with no relief at all.
11
 
The resulting dearth of employment discrimination cases going to trial 
may not be cause for much concern.  Indeed, it could be that the efforts of 
prior plaintiffs have resulted in the elimination of employment 
discrimination based on race, sex, and religion from the American 
workplace.  Nevertheless, discrimination has become more subtle,
12
 and 
evidence of continued employment discrimination based on sex and race 
abounds.
13
  It could also be, given arguments regarding judicial hostility to 
these cases, that these alternative practices are more effective in bringing 
relief to plaintiffs and in furthering the purposes of antidiscrimination laws.  
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part II.A–D (discussing the arbitration lane, internal employer grievance 
mechanism lane, procedure lane, and mediation and settlement lane). 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See generally Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 24–27 
(2006) (coining the concept of “[d]isplacement” for the phenomenon of legal claims that once 
were resolved in the legal system being resolved elsewhere); see infra Part II.A-D.  
 10.  See infra Part II.D (discussing EEOC’s mediation success). 
 11.  See Part II.C.  But cf. Galanter, supra note 9, at 25 (proposing as a possibility what we are 
seeing is not a “diminishment of trials, but their relocation”).  
 12.  See Krieger, supra note 4, at 1164 (recognizing that these “subtle, often unconscious 
forms” exist today); see also Anand Swaminathan, The Rubric of Force: Employment 
Discrimination in the Context of Subtle Biases and Judicial Hostility, 3 MOD. AM. 21, 23 (2007) 
(“[I]mplicit attitudes can be seen as closer to overt discrimination in that they reflect learned 
behavior or the suppression of previously held overt attitudes.”). 
 13.  See Dino Falaschetti, A Sex Difference in Risk Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies: 
Evidence from Females in Legislatures, 55 J.L. & ECON. 477, 478–79 (2012) (noting the 
persistence of “‘substantial gender inequality’”); Patrick L. Mason, Persistent Racial 
Discrimination in the Labor Market, in AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 141–45 
(Cecilia A. Conrad et al. eds., 2005) (explaining that racial discrimination in the labor market 
explains at least half of black-white inequity in pay); McCormick, supra note 4, at 194 (describing 
evidence that discrimination still abounds, particularly with respect to “people of color and white 
women”).  See generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: 
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1121–23 
(2006) (discussing how system justification theory explains how discrimination persists).   
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Unfortunately, there is no way to know how methods of alternative dispute 
resolution—such as arbitration, mediation, settlement, or internal employer 
grievance mechanisms—are actually working.  Most of these alternative 
dispute resolution systems are not studied and scrutinized by professionals.  
They exist “in the shadow of the law,” as commentators suggest.14  There is 
no realistic way to know if these alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
are bringing about just results.  In addition, these mechanisms do not alert 




There is another problem with condemning these alternative schemes.  
When Congress enacted these laws, it provided for a conciliation process 
and clearly envisioned that litigants would resolve at least some of these 
cases outside the court system.
16
  Thus, one could argue that the system is 
working consistently with Title VII’s conciliation goals by encouraging 
non-court dispute resolution.  This Article proposes that court-driven 
alternative dispute processes have gone well beyond what Congress 
envisioned in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
17
 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),18 and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”),19 and does not, in 
the long run, further the many purposes of anti-discrimination laws.
20
 
Most importantly, however, these alternative schemes suffer from a 
significant problem aside from difficulties in assessing their efficacy.  
These schemes provide no support for the “norm-enforcing” scheme that is 
the American legal system.  This Article, in the tradition of Professor Owen 
Fiss’s Against Settlement,21 addresses the potential effects of employment 
discrimination laws being enforced—if at all—through private dispute 
                                                          
 14.  See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 2 (1981) 
(discussing bargaining and regulation “in the shadow of the law”); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 
(1979) (coining this phrase in the context of divorce negotiations). 
 15.  See infra Part II.B. 
 16.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006) (“If the [EEOC] determines after such investigation 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the [EEOC] shall endeavor to 
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.”). 
 17.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006). 
 18.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006). 
 19.  29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
 20.  See infra Part III. 
 21.  See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, 
Against Settlement] (analyzing the alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) movement which 
promised to reduce the amount of litigation initiated); see also Owen M. Fiss, The History of an 
Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2009) [hereinafter Fiss, History of an Idea] (noting “the 
judgment of reasonableness is often made without the benefit of a truly adversarial process”).  
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resolution mechanisms.
22
  Anti-discrimination laws serve a vital public 
purpose—they set norms of behavior for workplaces and workers in the 
area of equal employment opportunity.  Indeed, some areas of employment 
discrimination law involve assessing what the “reasonable person” would 
believe.
23
  What other group is in a better position to make this assessment 
than a group of twelve jurors?
24
  Picking up on Marc Galanter’s work 
regarding the vanishing American trial,
25
 this Article argues that trials in 
this area provide an important public function in setting norms of 
appropriate workplace behavior and practices as well as setting monetary 
values for the harm employment discrimination causes its victims.
26
  As this 
Article will explain, there is cause for concern when alternative dispute 
schemes supplant jury trials in this area of the law. 
This Article begins by charting the many paths, including court 
developments and agency practices, that have led employment 
discrimination cases out of the court system and into alternative dispute 
resolution schemes.
27
  This Article also considers application of civil 
procedure rules that have left plaintiffs out of the court system and without 
a remedy altogether.
28
  It argues that some of the cases leading to these 
results are poorly decided, and indeed the courts frequently reach to remove 
these cases from the court system.
29
  This Article ultimately argues, from a 
                                                          
 22.  See infra Parts II.A–D.  
 23.  See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (sexual harassment is 
actionable if a “reasonable person” would find it “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment”). 
 24.  See Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and 
Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 809–19 (2002) 
[hereinafter Beiner, Let the Jury Decide] (presenting examples of numerous decisions reached 
outside of trial in which courts were hostile to plaintiffs’ claims, including instances where courts 
overturned jury decisions in the plaintiff’s favor); Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary 
Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 75 (1999) [hereinafter 
Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment] (acknowledging that, in the Title VII context, “[n]o 
longer are these cases being taken from judicial fact finding, but instead from a jury of the 
plaintiff’s peers”). 
 25.  See Galanter, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing “an abundance of data that shows that trials, 
federal and state, civil and criminal, jury and bench, are declining precipitously”); see also Marc 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 468 (2004) (acknowledging, however, that “[f]or 
30 years, even as the portion of cases tried has fallen, civil rights has remained the type of case 
most likely to reach trial” (emphasis added)).  Interestingly, while all civil trials are decreasing, 
employment discrimination trials are decreasing at a slower rate than other civil categories.  
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 124 (noting the drop in trials in 
employment discrimination cases during the period they studied was “only thirty-three percent”).   
 26.  See infra Part III. 
 27.  See infra Parts II.A–D. 
 28.  See infra Part II.C. 
 29.  See infra Parts II.A–C. 
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policy perspective, that more trials are important in this area of the law.  
Eschewing problems plaintiffs encounter in this area of the law, this Article 
advocates that trials are an important means of vindicating the public 
purposes behind employment discrimination laws.
30
 
II.  THE ROAD OUT OF COURT 
The road that leads employment discrimination claims out of the 
federal court system is multi-laned.  First, while the courts initially 
disfavored arbitration of employment discrimination claims, eventually the 
Supreme Court reinvigorated the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),31 
leading to widespread enforcement of employment arbitration agreements.
32
  
Second, the Court created an affirmative defense in sexual harassment cases 
that created an incentive for employers to create internal grievance 
mechanisms to handle such complaints.
33
  After the Court’s recent decision 
in Staub v. Proctor Hospital,
34
 it appears that the Court is leaning toward 
deferring to employer grievance mechanisms for all employment 
discrimination cases.
35
  Third, the EEOC itself has increased its efforts to 
mediate these cases.
36
  While this action may come from the agency’s 
honest desire to achieve the best results for plaintiffs, it means that some 
meritorious cases of discrimination will never come to the public’s 
awareness, as they result in mediated settlements with confidentiality 
provisions.
37
  Finally, many scholars have noted that courts and defendants 
have used rules of civil procedure to thwart the efforts of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs with meritorious claims.
38
  Some of the 
observations of these scholars, as well as studies supporting their claims, 
will be canvassed in this Part.
39
 
                                                          
 30.  See infra Parts III–IV. 
 31.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 32.  See infra Part II.A. 
 33.  See infra Part II.B. 
 34.  131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
 35.  See infra Part II.B. 
 36.  See infra Part II.D. 
 37.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (2010) (providing that information contained in a charge under 
Title VII or the ADA shall be kept confidential, but can be made public if a proceeding is 
instituted under the ADA or Title VII involving that charge).  
 38.  See infra Part II.C. 
 39.  See infra Part II.C. 
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A.  The Arbitration Lane 
Initially, the federal courts were reluctant to enforce arbitration 
provisions in employment agreements that forbade employees from 
pursuing statutory employment discrimination claims in court.
40
  The EEOC 
agreed with this position in its 1997 policy statement.
41
  The courts’ 
position began to change in 1991, however, with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.
42
 
In Gilmer, the Court held that a plaintiff in an ADEA case could be 
forced into compulsory arbitration by an arbitration agreement contained in 
a securities registration application.
43
  In doing so, the Court concluded that 
arbitration of ADEA claims was not inconsistent with the statutory 
framework or purposes of the Act.
44
  The Court, however, did note that not 
all statutory claims are appropriate for arbitration, and explained that if 
Congress itself intended to preclude parties from waiving court remedies 
for a particular statutory claim, arbitration would be inappropriate.
45
  This 
interpretation ultimately left open the possibility that courts might read 
other anti-discrimination statutes differently. 
There was another wrinkle in the Federal Arbitration Act that gave 
plaintiffs hope that employment discrimination claims would fall outside of 
the FAA’s mandatory arbitration language—Section 1 of the FAA.46  
Section 1 of the FAA exempts from its mandate for arbitration “contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”47  In extending FAA coverage 
to the ADEA claim in Gilmer, the Court avoided the issue of whether the 
claim fell under Section 1’s exemption by arguing that the arbitration 
provision was not in the employee’s contract of employment but was 
                                                          
 40.  See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 (1974) (holding that an 
employee subject to a collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”) could pursue a race 
discrimination claim under Title VII, despite prior arbitration pursuant to the CBA); Utley v. 
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff in Title VII sex 
discrimination suit was not required to arbitrate a claim pursuant to an arbitration agreement).  
 41.  EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY 
BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF 
EMPLOYMENT (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html. 
 42.  500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (concluding that plaintiff did not meet his burden to show that 
Congress intended to exclude arbitration of claims under the ADEA). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 26–30. 
 45.  Id. at 26.  Indeed, the plaintiff in Gilmer conceded that there was no legislative history or 
statutory text to support this for the ADEA.  Id. at 26–27. 
 46.  See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (exempting workers in foreign and interstate commerce from 
FAA). 
 47.  Id. 
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instead in his registration application.
48
  Thus, the Court “le[ft] for another 
day the issue” of whether Section 1 exempted all employment agreements.49  
The possibility remained that when faced with an actual agreement between 
employer and employee, the Court might hold that the FAA’s Section 1 
exemption applied. 
The Court finally decided this issue in 2001 in Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams.
50
  In this case, the Court held that only employment contracts 
involving employees who worked directly in commerce, like the seamen 
and railroad employees listed in Section 1, fit within the exemption from 
arbitration.
51
 A majority of the Court rejected a variety of arguments raised 
by the plaintiff, Adams, who did not raise his claims under federal 
antidiscrimination laws but instead raised them under California’s Fair 
Employment and Housing Act.
52
  Adams argued that the Court should 
interpret the exemption phrase “any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce” in Section 1 broadly to encompass the 
limits of Congress’s contemporary Commerce Clause authority.53  Because 
the Court had earlier adopted an expansive reading of the phrase 
“transaction involving commerce” in Section 2 of the FAA,54 Adams argued 
that the Court should likewise read the language of Section 1 expansively.
55
  
The Court rejected this argument on numerous grounds, including 
reasoning that the principle of ejusdem generis suggested that the specific 
words used in the phrase—”seaman” and “railroad workers”—implied that 
the residual term was meant to encompass similar workers.
56
  The Court 
also explained that the distinctions between the phrases “involving 
commerce” (used in Section 2) and “in . . . interstate commerce” (used in 
Section 1) suggested that the latter phrase was narrower.
57
 
The Court also rejected the argument that Congress limited its 
language in the Section 1 exemption because a series of Supreme Court 
decisions in the early twentieth century limited Congress’s authority over 
                                                          
 48.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. 
 49.  Id.  The parties in Gilmer also did not raise the issue, but instead amicus curiae raised it.  
Id.   
 50.  532 U.S. 105, 112–13 (2001) (explaining that, while the Court in Gilmer did not deem it 
necessary to reach the meaning of Section 1, “the issue reserved in Gilmer is presented here”). 
 51.  Id. at 115, 119. 
 52.  Id. at 110.   
 53.  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114. 
 54.  See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277, 279–80 (1995) (reading 
“involving commerce” in Section 2 of the FAA to reach the full extent of Congress’s current 
commerce clause authority). 
 55.  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114. 
 56.  Id. at 114–15. 
 57.  Id. at 115–17.   
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employment-related commerce.
58
  Adams argued that this decision evinced 
Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of its authority at the time in 
enacting Section 1, and thus, like the modern interpretation of Section 2, 
this boundary now included workers like himself.
59
  The Court, however, 
was not swayed by these arguments and extended the FAA to Adams’s state 
law employment discrimination claims.
60
 
The Court’s holding still left an opening for plaintiffs to litigate 
specific federal anti-discrimination claims if Congress expressed an 
intention not to send the particular type of claim to arbitration.  With the 
                                                          
 58.  Justice Souter described the state of the law in 1925, when the FAA was passed, well in 
his dissent: 
When the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely confined) our case law 
indicated that the only employment relationships subject to the commerce power were 
those in which workers were actually engaged in interstate commerce.  Thus, by using 
“engaged in” for the exclusion, Congress showed an intent to exclude to the limit of its 
power to cover employment contracts in the first place, and it did so just as clearly as its 
use of “involving commerce” showed its intent to legislate to the hilt over commercial 
contracts at a more general level.  
Id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 59.  The Court was still in the heyday of the Lochner era in 1925 when the FAA was enacted. 
During this period, it struck many state and federal laws regulating the conditions of work.  See, 
e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 285, 302 (1936) (holding the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds, reasoning that “‘[m]ining is not 
interstate commerce, but like manufacturing, is a local business, subject to local regulation and 
taxation’”); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (holding a minimum 
wage law for women unconstitutional).  For more on Lochner, see PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW 
YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 2 (1998) (proposing to discuss Lochner, which for 
“eighty years [] has served legal scholars as a poignant example of judicial activism”); Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lessons of Lochner, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1447–55 (2001) (discussing the lessons from Lochner and suggesting 
that “even if there was a jurisprudential basis for Lochner-era decisions, the critique of 
constitutional judging as inconsistent with democracy still found full voice”); Stephen A. Siegel, 
Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 
(1991) (describing Lochner as a “transitional era” during which “tenets of early and modern 
American constitutionalism” blended together); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. 
L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (understanding Lochner from a different perspective—that is, “to 
symbolize not merely an aggressive judicial role, but an approach that imposes a constitutional 
requirement of neutrality, and understands the term to refer to preservation of the existing 
distribution of wealth and entitlements under the baseline of the common law”).  There are a 
plethora of other articles on Lochner.  As Cass Sunstein noted in Lochner’s Legacy, criticism of 
the Lochner era as representing overreaching by the Court into areas that belonged to the political 
branches has “spawned an enormous literature.”  Sunstein, supra, at 874.  Recently, however, this 
view has been challenged.  See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3 (2011) (offering “the first comprehensive 
modern analysis of Lochner and its progeny, free from the baggage of the tendentious accounts of 
Progressives, New Dealers, and their successors on the left and, surprisingly, the right.”). 
 60.  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119 (“In sum, the text of the FAA forecloses the construction of 
§ 1 followed by the Court of Appeals in the case under review, a construction which would 
exclude all employment contracts from the FAA.” (emphasis added)). 
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exception of a brief period of time in the Ninth Circuit,
61
 however, each 
court that addressed this issue held that the FAA covered Title VII, ADA, 
and ADEA claims.
62
  Indeed, without ever considering the legislative 
history of the antidiscrimination statutes involved in the case, the Court in 
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
63
 broadly endorsed arbitration to resolve 
employment-related disputes.
64
  In that case, the Court stated that 
“[e]mployment contracts . . . are covered by the FAA.”65  It also explained 
that federal statutory claims can be resolved pursuant to arbitration 
agreements because such agreements do not amount to a waiver of a 
statutory claim, but rather simply select the forum in which the claimant 
will pursue the claim.
66
  The Court specifically avoided looking at the 
purposes behind the FAA and the ADA, instead reasoning that the statutory 
text provided a clear answer to the specific question involved—whether the 
EEOC could pursue a claim on an employee’s behalf in spite of his 
arbitration agreement with the employer.
67
  In concluding that the EEOC 
did have such authority, the Court had no need to address the policies 
underlying the ADA and what those policies might indicate about the 
arbitrability of claims by individuals. 
Interestingly, there is considerable support in both the legislative 
history of the ADA and the amendments to Title VII through the Civil 
                                                          
 61.  See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(stating “Duffield ha[d] met her burden of showing that Congress intended in enacting the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 to preclude the compulsory arbitration of Title VII disputes”), overruled by 
EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 62.  See Luce, 345 F.3d at 748–49 (canvassing circuit courts and stating that “[a]ll of the other 
circuits have concluded that Title VII does not bar compulsory arbitration agreements”); see also 
14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) (holding CBAs “clearly and unmistakably 
require[] union members to arbitrate ADEA claims”); Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., 
703 F.3d 36, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that the FAA preempts the ADA claim brought by 
plaintiffs). 
 63.  534 U.S. 279 (2002).  The Court in this case addressed whether the EEOC could bring a 
lawsuit under the ADA on behalf of a wronged employee in spite of the employee’s prior consent 
to an arbitration agreement that covered the claim.  Id. at 282.  In ruling that the EEOC had an 
independent right to pursue the action, the Court made clear in its opinion that its analysis applied 
to Title VII as well.  Id. at 287, 295–96.  
 64.  Id. at 289, 295 n.10, 296.  Courts have relied on language from this case in enforcing 
arbitration agreements.  See, e.g., Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560 
(M.D. N.C. 2004) (noting that despite the FAA’s limiting language, “the FAA applies to most 
employment contracts, including at-will employment contracts”); Gillispie v. Vill. of Franklin 
Park, 405 F. Supp. 2d 904, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (same).  
 65.  Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 289. 
 66.  Id. at 295 n.10 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 472 
U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).  Neither 
of the cases cited examined whether Congress intended for such statutory claims to be pressed into 
mandatory arbitration by pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  
 67.  Id. at 285–87. 
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Rights Act of 1991 that Congress did not intend to force employees to 
arbitrate these claims.
68
  The impetus to send Title VII claims to arbitration 
comes through Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
69
  In Section 
118, Congress stated: “Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by 
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement 
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, 
and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or 
provisions of Federal law amended by this title.”70 
The ADA has similar language.
71
  The Older Worker Benefits 
Protection Act (“OWBPA”),72 an amendment to the ADEA, likewise 
                                                          
 68.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97 (1991) (“The Committee emphasizes, however, 
that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, 
the remedies provided by Title VII.  Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any 
agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration . . . does not preclude the affected person from 
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.” (emphasis added)). 
 69.  Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991). 
 70.  Id. (emphasis added).  Section 118, however, does not appear as a section within Title 42, 
Chapter 21, Subchapter VI of the U.S. Code.  Instead, Congress placed it in the notes following 
Section 1981.  42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2006).  This does not, however, undermine its force as law.  
After laws are passed by Congress and signed by the President, they are published in 
chronological order in the Statutes at Large, which serves as “‘legal evidence’” of the law.  
Gonzalez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 661 n.6 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 1 U.S.C. § 112; 
Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law, 101 LAW LIBR. 
J. 545, 546 (2009)). That chronological arrangement, however, is not efficient for researchers, and 
therefore, the statutes are arranged by subject matter for publication in the U.S. Code.  Gonzalez, 
671 F.3d at 661 n.6 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 285b; Whisner, supra, at 546).  Title 1 of U.S.C. § 204(a) 
declares that the U.S. Code establishes “‘prima facie the laws of the United States, general and 
permanent in their nature . . . Provided, however, [t]hat whenever titles of such Code shall have 
been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein 
contained, in all the courts[.]”  United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964).  The Supreme 
Court has said that “‘the very meaning of “prima facie” is that the Code cannot prevail over the 
Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.’”  Id. (quoting Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 
423, 426 (1943)).  Even where Congress has enacted a codification into positive law, the “‘change 
of arrangement . . . cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment.  For it 
will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their 
effect, unless such intention is clearly expressed.’”  Id. (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra 
Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957)).  If construction of a section of the U.S. Code that has not been 
enacted into positive law is necessary, “‘recourse must be had to the original statutes 
themselves.’”  Id. (quoting Murrell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 160 F.2d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 1947)).  The 
Office of Law Revision Counsel prepared and continues to prepare titles of the United States Code 
for reenactment as positive law by Congress in order to “‘remove ambiguities, contradictions, and 
other imperfections both of substance and of form,’ while ‘conform[ing] to the understood policy, 
intent, and purpose of the Congress in the original enactments.’”  Gonzalez, 671 F.3d at 661 n.6 
(citing 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (2006); Whisner, supra, at 553–56).  For those titles that Congress has 
enacted into positive law, the Code constitutes “‘legal evidence’” of the law.  Id. (citing 1 U.S.C. 
§ 204(a) (2006)).  Thus, while the placement of Section 118 as a note in the U.S. Code is unusual, 
it is contained in the Statutes at Large as well.  Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991). 
 71.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (applying Section 1981a to the ADA); see also text 
accompanying note 70. 
  
848 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:837 
protects older workers in signing arbitration agreements.
73
  Section 118 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 “encourage[s]” parties in Title VII cases to use 
alternative dispute resolution but does not mandate it.
74
  Instead the section 
suggests its use “[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law.”75  
What does it mean to “encourage” alternative dispute resolution?  Most 
lower courts that have considered the issue have concluded that this 
language is not ambiguous but rather expresses Congress’s clear preference 
for alternative dispute resolution.
76
  As a result, few courts have 
investigated the legislative history of this section carefully, asserting instead 
that the clarity of the language did not necessitate it.
77
 
Upon scrutiny of the legislative history of Section 118, one 
understands that it was convenient for the lower courts to assess its 
language as unambiguous.  The section of the House Report addressing the 
alternative dispute resolution provision makes clear that Congress did not 
intend for courts to enforce, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements absent both parties’ consent: 
Section 216 encourages the use of alternative means of dispute 
resolution to resolve disputes arising under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 . . . or the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act . . . where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law. . . .  
This section is intended to encourage alternative means of dispute 
resolution that are already authorized by law.
78
 
                                                          
 72.  Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
29 U.S.C.). 
 73.  See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2006) (“An individual may not waive any right or claim 
under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary.  Except as provided in paragraph 
(2), a waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum . . . (C) the 
individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed.”).  
 74.  Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“[W]e assume, as does the Supreme Court, that the drafters of Title VII and the 
amendments introduced in the Act were well aware of what language was required for Congress to 
evince an intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies.”); Rosenberg v.  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that “Congress has repeatedly 
rejected legislation that would explicitly bar mandatory agreements to arbitrate employment 
discrimination claims” and holding “neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history” 
illustrates this preclusive intent); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co, Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 
1998) (same). 
 77.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 752–53 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“We conclude . . . that this history should not be relied on to establish that Congress 
intended to preclude waiver of a judicial forum in derogation of a clear and unambiguous 
statute.”). 
 78.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97 (1991). 
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The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms “is intended to supplement, not supplant, the 
remedies provided by Title VII.”79  Thus, for example, “the Committee 
believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, 
whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an 
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking 
relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.”80  As the Committee 
further mentions, “[t]his view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.”81  Finally, 
the House Report adds that “[t]he Committee does not intend this section to 
be used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be 
available.”82 
While the language of Section 118 is ambiguous, this legislative 
history is not.  Indeed, this House Report reveals that Congress meant for 
victims of employment discrimination, at least for purposes of Title VII and 
the ADA,
83
 to have all available methods of enforcing their statutory rights 
at their disposal.
84
  The Committee’s reference to Gardner-Denver 
solidifies this position.  In 1974’s Gardner-Denver, the Court held that an 
employee who arbitrated his age claim pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement’s arbitration provision could not be precluded from pursuing his 
case in court.
85
  Thus, the House Report’s reference to Gardner-Denver 
further supports that Congress intended for plaintiffs to have court actions 
as an option—rather than be limited by pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  
This position makes sense, given that the 1991 Act expanded remedies for 
victims of discrimination, including permitting jury trials
86
 as well as 
awards of compensatory and punitive damages.
87
  Limiting plaintiffs to 
                                                          
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.; 415 U.S. 36, 48–49 (1974). 
 82.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97. 
 83.  The Act also covered cases brought under Section 1981, which covers race 
discrimination.  Id. 
 84.  Indeed, early commentators looking at the language opined that the history might well 
cause problems for enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements.  See, e.g., Thomas J. 
Piskorski & David B. Ross, Private Arbitration as the Exclusive Means of Resolving Employment-
Related Disputes, 19 EMP. RELATIONS L.J. 205, 208–09 (1993) (“This legislative history could 
limit the support Section 118 otherwise would provide to the proponents of the enforceability of 
private arbitration agreements with respect to statutory claims”).   
 85.  415 U.S. at 59–60. 
 86.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006) (“If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive 
damages under this section—(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.”). 
 87.  Id. § 1981a(b). 
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arbitration under certain circumstances is inconsistent with the general 
purpose of the 1991 Act, which expanded court remedies. 
Yet, the only circuit court to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
intended to preserve court remedies in the face of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements was the Ninth Circuit,
88
 and that position was short-lived thanks 
to the momentum of other circuits holding otherwise.
89
  Few of the courts of 
appeals that addressed the issue have explicitly engaged the language in the 
House Report described above.  The Supreme Court alluded to it in a 
footnote in the 2009 case 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
90
 but conveniently 
avoided engaging in much analysis of the House Report, instead opining 
rather summarily: 
But the legislative history mischaracterizes the holding of 
Gardner-Denver, which does not prohibit collective bargaining 
for arbitration of ADEA claims.  Moreover, reading the 
legislative history in the manner suggested by respondents would 
create a direct conflict with the statutory text, which encourages 
the use of arbitration for dispute resolution without imposing any 




The Court’s cursory analysis did not do the competing argument 
justice, as it could have read this legislative history consistently with the 
statutory text.  The Court could have read the statute as “encourage[ing]” 
parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution when they agreed to do so 
post-dispute.  Indeed, this interpretation seems the most reasonable reading 
when one considers the House Report, statutory text, and the Civil Rights 
Act’s purpose to expand court remedies for discrimination.92 
The few courts of appeals that have considered the language, including 
the First Circuit and ultimately the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that it did 
not evince congressional intent to provide a choice for plaintiffs who 
entered into pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  The First Circuit in 
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
93
 reasoned that the 
                                                          
 88.  See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Col, 144 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998), 
overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748–49 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 89.  See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 748–49 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that “[i]n the post-Gilmer world, our decision in Duffield stands alone”); Rosenberg v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding “there was no 
congressional intent to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements manifested in the 1991 CRA or 
the OWBPA[,]” despite concluding that the agreement in the case was not enforceable). 
 90.  556 U.S. 247, 259 n.6 (2009) (noting that “Section 118 expresses Congress’s support for 
alternative dispute resolution”). 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  See supra text accompanying notes 78–87. 
 93.  170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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Court’s decision in Gilmer, coming some six months before the enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, was evidence of Congress’s acquiescence 
in the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
94
  In addition, it 
relied on an earlier case it decided involving the ADA, which included 
similar language in its legislative history.
95
  The Rosenberg court also 
reasoned that language in the OWBPA stating an older worker could not 
“waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed” 
was meant to apply only to the underlying statutory rights and not the right 
to jury trial.
96
  The Ninth Circuit, after initially holding that statutory 
discrimination claims were not subject to pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements, changed its position.
97
 
While there may be some question as to what evidence from floor 
debates shows regarding the interpretation of Section 118,
98
 the House 
Report is the most authoritative interpretation of what Congress meant by 
the provision.  The Supreme Court has stated “that the authoritative source 
for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, 
which ‘represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those 
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’”99  
Reliance on the comments of a single member or statements from floor 
debates is discouraged.
100
  Thus, committee reports, such as the House 
                                                          
 94.  Id. at 8.  
 95.  See id. at 9 (noting that the ADA’s language can only reasonably be interpreted as 
favoring arbitration (citing Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 150 (1st Cir. 1998))).  
 96.  Id. at 12 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006)).  There is dicta in Gilmer that supports this 
position.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (“Congress . . . did not 
explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent 
amendments to the ADEA.”). 
 97.  See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that its holding in Duffield was “in error[,]” concluding that it incorrectly interpreted the 
1991 Act’s text, legislative history, and general purpose). 
 98.  See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that “Congress in fact specifically rejected a proposal that would have allowed employers to 
enforce ‘compulsory arbitration’ agreements”), overruled by Luce, 345 F.3d at 760 (suggesting the 
same). 
 99.  Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 
186 (1969)). 
 100.  Id. (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) (“We have eschewed reliance on 
the passing comments of one Member and casual statements from the floor debates.”); Consumer 
Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (finding despite support 
for petitioners’ argument “in a Conference Report four years after the enactment of [the relevant 
provision of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) at issue] . . . ‘legislative history’ of this 
sort cannot be viewed as controlling”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) 
(suggesting that “the more authoritative reports of the Senate and Armed Services Committees” 
are particularly helpful resources in deciphering legislative purpose). 
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Report concerning Section 118, are more authoritative than statements or 
comments made on the House or Senate floor.
101
 
One need not conclude that the courts are necessarily wrong about 
enforcing arbitration clauses in this context to make the larger point that 
these cases are finding a way out of the court system.  The purpose of 
recounting some of the history here is not to assess whether the U.S. 
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts made the correct assessment on 
this particular issue.
102
  The point here is that there is a reasonable reading 
of the statute and its legislative history that would have precluded an 
employer from forcing an employee into arbitration against his or her will 
on the basis of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  The courts, however, 
chose to go in the opposite direction, making these contracts enforceable.
103
  
Similarly, one could read the OWBPA’s preclusion of enforcement of 
employment agreements that include provisions that “waive rights or claims 
that may arise after the date the waiver is executed” to encompass the right 
to jury trial.
104
  Yet, most courts that have considered it have refused to read 
the statutory text in this manner.
105
  These decisions in and of themselves 
provide evidence that courts are sending these cases out of court and to 
arbitration when there are compelling arguments that Congress intended 
otherwise.  Thus, in situations in which the courts have leeway in 
interpreting employment discrimination law in a manner that tends to lead 
                                                          
 101.  See supra note 100; see also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 
384, 395–96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Resort to legislative history is only justified where 
the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond 
Committee reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. . . .  [T]o select 
casual statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as a basis 
for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is to substitute ourselves for the 
Congress in one of its important functions.”). 
 102.  See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196–97 (suggesting in the debates that the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 was not intended to preclude enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements; however, the 
House Report, which provides a more authoritative interpretation of the statute than statements by 
law makers from the floor, is more reasonably read to preclude enforcement of these agreements). 
 103.  See supra text accompanying notes 4546–67, 93–97. 
 104.  See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(quoting 2 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)) (“Amici point to legislative history that suggests that Congress was 
particularly concerned about older workers losing the right to a jury trial for ADEA claims.”). 
 105.  Id. at 13 (“A party who agrees to arbitrate ‘does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’”); see 
also Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1139 (1999) (noting that that OWBPA’s legislative history “provide[s] persuasive evidence that 
the protection it affords is limited to the waiver of substantive rights under the ADEA”); Williams 
v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he OWBPA protects against 
the waiver of a right or claim, not against the waiver of a judicial forum.”).  But see Hammaker v. 
Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580–81 (E.D. Va. 2002) (distinguishing Seus, 
Rosenberg, and Williams and holding that the right to jury trial was one of the rights not subject to 
waiver under Section (C) of the OWBPA).   
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such cases out of court, the courts are not bashful in exercising their 
interpretative powers to make it so.
106
 
B.  The Internal Employer Grievance Mechanism Lane 
Another means courts are using to take employment discrimination 
claims out of court is supporting the use of employer grievance mechanisms 
as a defense in such cases.
107
  The Court appears to be in the process of 
extending a defense that arose in the context of sexual harassment cases
108
 
to all forms of employment discrimination claims.  In the seemingly pro-
plaintiff 2011 Supreme Court case Staub v. Proctor Hospital,
109
 the Court 
suggested in the context of a discrimination claim under the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) that 
employees who fail to take advantage of internal employer grievance 
mechanisms might be precluded from proceeding in court.
110
  Similar to 
arbitration case law, this line of cases could lead many employment 
discrimination cases out of court. 
                                                          
 106.  There is a significant body of work criticizing the use of arbitration in the context of 
employment agreements.  See, e.g., Craig Smith & Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil 
Justice: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 281, 292 (2012) (disagreeing with enforcement of employment arbitration agreements on 
numerous grounds, including that they are not the result of arms-length bargaining and quoting 
with approval the Court’s position in Gilmer that “because arbitrators generally do not issue 
opinions, mandatory arbitration would result ‘in a lack of public knowledge of employers’ 
discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of the 
development of the law’”); see also infra notes 338–346 and accompanying text.   
 107.  See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The 
Endogeniety of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 
407–08 (1999) (describing how employer created grievance mechanisms were incorporated into 
legal standards by the courts).  See generally Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and 
Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. 
J. SOC. 1401, 1422–35 (1990) (providing empirical evidence illustrating that “[t]he civil rights 
movement and mandates of the 1960s altered organizations’ legal environments by heightening 
societal attention to issues of fair governance”). 
 108.  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) (stating that, while an 
employer is “subject to vicarious liability . . . for an actionable hostile environment[,]” the 
employer may raise an affirmative defense comprising of two elements: “(a) that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and 
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise”); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998) (same). 
 109.  131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
 110.  See id. at 1194 n.4 (expressing no direct opinion on whether or not the defendant would 
have been able to use an affirmative defense if the plaintiff did not take advantage of the 
employer’s grievance mechanism despite recognizing that the plaintiff took advantage of the 
employer’s grievance process). 
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Internal employee grievance mechanisms have traditionally played a 
role in sexual harassment cases.
111
  In the first case in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized a claim for sexual harassment—Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson
112—the Court considered what effect an employer complaint 
process might have on an employer’s liability for such discrimination.113  
The defendant in Meritor argued that it had an internal complaint process 
that the plaintiff should have used but did not.
114
  The employer argued that 
failure to use the provided grievance process provided a defense to 
liability.
115
  Avoiding a definitive rule on the issue, the Court held that the 
grievance process set up by the employer in that case was insufficient on a 
number of grounds.
116
  In particular, it required the employee, Ms. Vinson, 
to report the sexual harassment to her harasser, who was also her 
supervisor.
117
  After the Court’s determination in Meritor, the courts of 
appeals adopted a variety of approaches to the issue.
118
  Eventually the 
jurisprudence became sufficiently confused on the issue of liability for 
supervisor harassment that the Court granted certiorari on the issue in 




The Court in these two cases determined that an employer is 
vicariously liable for supervisor hostile environment harassment, subject to 
an affirmative defense to “liability or damages.”120  The defense is 
                                                          
 111.  See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher 
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004) (explaining how the courts have 
created incentives for employers to use these mechanisms). 
 112.  477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 113.  Id. at 72–73 (“reject[ing] petitioner’s view that the mere existence of a grievance 
procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with respondent’s failure to invoke that 
procedure, must insulate petitioner from liability”). 
 114.  Id. at 72. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 72–73 (suggesting that petitioner could bolster its contention that its 
nondiscrimination policy and internal grievance procedure should “insulate” it from liability “if its 
procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward”). 
 117.  Id. at 73. 
 118.  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785–86 (1998) (acknowledging 
confusion in lower courts). 
 119.  See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) (“We granted certiorari 
to assist in defining the relevant standards of employer liability.”); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785–86 
(same).  
 120.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.  No court has ever used the defense 
to limit damages, although the Faragher and Ellerth Courts clearly contemplated it.  Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.  Quid pro quo cases, in which a supervisor takes a 
tangible employment action against a plaintiff, are not subject to the defense.  The employer is 
vicariously liable in such a case.  See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating “[n]o affirmative defense is 
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comprised of two parts.  First, the employer must show that it took 
reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment.
121
  Second, the 
employer must show that the employee failed to take advantage of any 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.
122
  An internal grievance mechanism could help an employer 
satisfy both prongs of the affirmative defense.  The existence of an anti-
discrimination policy and grievance mechanism might help the employer 
show that it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct any sexual 
harassment of which it became aware.
123
  The employer could also use its 
anti-discrimination policy and grievance mechanism to satisfy the second 
prong, by showing that the employee failed to take advantage of such a 
program.
124
  Thus, the Court essentially promoted the use of such grievance 
mechanisms as an antidote to liability for sexual harassment.
125
  Many 
employers picked up on this position and created such policies to “bullet 
proof[]” themselves from potential liability for supervisor harassment.126 
The Court in Ellerth and Faragher was clear in articulating why it set 
up such a standard for harassment claims.  First, it explained that such a 
defense would not be available if the supervisor took some action against 
the harassed employee because he or she refused to agree to the sexually 
explicit demands of his or her supervisor.
127
  Generally referred to as quid 
pro quo claims, it was clear to the Court “that if an employer demanded 
sexual favors from an employee in return for a job benefit, discrimination 
with respect to terms or conditions of employment was explicit.”128  Hostile 
environment sexual harassment, however, was different.
129
  In this context, 
the employer, in theory, obtained no benefit from this behavior and often 
had policies that prohibited employees from committing such acts of 
                                                          
available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment 
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment”). 
 121.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 122.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 123.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 124.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 125.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (explaining that an anti-harassment policy with complaint 
process would help employers prove the affirmative defense); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 
(same). 
 126.  Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment 
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 976 (1999). 
 127.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (both noting the defense is only 
available if no tangible employment action is taken against harassed employee).  
 128.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752. 
 129.  See id. (distinguishing between quid pro quo claims and hostile environment claims and 
suggesting that “[l]ess obvious was whether an employer’s sexually demeaning behavior altered 
terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII”). 
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harassment.
130
  Thus, plaintiffs had difficulty arguing that such behavior 
was within the course and scope of the supervisor’s employment.  From the 
Court’s perspective, this behavior might occur even when the employer 
explicitly forbade it in its workplace.
131
  As a result, for an employer who 
had made attempts to eliminate harassment and provide relief internally for 
victims of harassment, the Court set up this affirmative defense. 
Commentators have criticized this defense because it requires an 
employer simply to put some sort of training program and grievance 
mechanism in place without determining what sorts of programs might 
actually work to address and eliminate harassment.
132
  It became very easy 
for employers who did so to escape liability for even egregious forms of 
sexual harassment.
133
  In addition, employers were not liable for co-worker 
harassment unless they “knew or should have known of the harassment” 
and failed to take reasonable corrective action.
134
  Under this standard, an 
employee who does not complain through an internal grievance process 
fails to give notice to the employer; thus, the employer generally would 
have no reason to know of the harassment and would escape liability for co-
worker harassment as well.
135
  Indeed, the courts tend to look at these cases 
as resulting from the acts of “one bad apple”—that is, one bad employee—
instead of being the result of a more systemic problem at the place of 
                                                          
 130.  Id. at 757. 
 131.  See id. at 756 (explaining that it is not clear how hostile environment harassment benefits 
the employer). 
 132.  See infra text accompanying notes 312–318. 
 133.  See infra text accompanying notes 312–318. 
 134.  See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)–(e) (2013) (“With respect to conduct between fellow 
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the 
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, 
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.”); see also Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 799 (noting that circuits had “uniformly” judged co-worker harassment under a 
negligence standard); EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 675 (4th Cir. 2011) (“So long as the 
employer’s response to each known incident of coworker harassment is reasonably prompt, and 
the employer takes remedial measures that are reasonably calculated to end the harassment, 
liability may not be imputed to the employer as a matter of law.”); Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 
762 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining plaintiff “must demonstrate that her employer ‘failed to provide a 
reasonable avenue for complaint’ or that ‘it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known, about the harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action’” (quoting 
Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000))); Courtney v. Landair Transp., 
Inc., 227 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n coworker cases the standard is based on a 
‘reasonableness’ standard: ‘when an employer responds to charges of coworker sexual 
harassment, the employer can be liable only if its response manifests indifference or 
unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.’” (quoting 
Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872–73 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
 135.  See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 126, at 975 (stating an employee who does not use his 
employer’s grievance process is without redress). 
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employment.
136




The courts have been less reluctant to hold employers liable for more 
traditional forms of discrimination—namely, discriminatory failure to hire, 
firing, pay discrimination, etc.
138
  A defense based on an employer 
grievance process was not thought to extend to these types of employer 
actions.
139
  There are suggestions in Staub, however, that the Court is 
considering extending the rationale of the Ellerth/Faragher line of cases to 
the average employment discrimination claim, at least under certain 
circumstances.
140
  In Staub, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by 
Justice Scalia, purported to resolve the split over application of subordinate 
bias liability in employment discrimination suits.
141
  The issue arose in an 
unusual discrimination setting—discrimination based on the plaintiff’s 
membership in the United States Army Reserve.
142
  Staub argued that two 
supervisors harbored resentment toward him because of his military service 
and were determined to see him fired.
143
  Eventually, these supervisors 
wrote Staub up for workplace infractions that Staub disputed, and an 
employee in the human resources department, Buck, made the decision to 
fire him.
144
  There was no evidence that Buck acted based on her own 
discriminatory animus.
145
  At the time of his termination, Staub complained 
to Buck that the two other supervisors wanted him fired because of his 
military service.
146
  Buck reviewed Staub’s entire employment file and 
                                                          
 136.  See Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 817, 818–26 (2005) (arguing that courts tend to see discriminatory harassment as the act of 
“one bad apple,” and thus an individual problem, instead of a workplace-wide problem). 
 137.  See id. at 835 (explaining the Court’s word choice indicates an individual rather than 
organizational focus, thus showcasing its reluctance to hold an employer liable). 
 138.  Indeed, Title VII explicitly applies to these forms of discrimination.  The statute states, 
among other things, that it is an unlawful employment practice “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2006). 
 139.  The Court’s refusal to extend the defense to tangible employment actions in Ellerth and 
Faragher supports this interpretation.  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 
(1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).   
 140.  See supra text accompanying note 110, infra text accompanying notes 159–164.  
 141.  Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189, 1191 (2011). 
 142.  Id. at 1189. 
 143.  Id. at 1190. 
 144.  Id. at 1189–90. 
 145.  Id. at 1190. 
 146.  Id. at 1189–90. 
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decided to fire him anyway.
147




The employer hospital argued that the independent investigation of the 
alleged discriminatory animus by Buck (and her rejection of the allegations) 
should negate any prior discrimination.
149
  The Court rejected this 
contention in part, explaining that if the decisionmaker’s actions were not 
based on the original biased actions, an employer would not be liable under 
USERRA; however, if the decisionmaker takes the biased information or 
report into consideration in the decisionmaking process, bias can remain a 
causal factor in the decision.
150
  As Justice Scalia explained, “[w]e are 
aware of no principle in tort or agency law under which an employer’s mere 
conduct of an independent investigation has a claim-preclusive effect.”151  
Thus, the Court seemed skeptical of the use of internal investigations as a 
mechanism by which employers can break the chain of causation, although 
it did contemplate that an employer may have legitimate reasons for an 
adverse employment action that, while not encompassing discriminatory 
animus, will relieve it of liability.
152
 
While the Court explained this in the body of its decision, in a footnote 
later in the case, the Court appears to suggest that internal employee 
grievance mechanisms might provide a defense to employer liability if an 
employee, unlike Staub, did not complain through such a process.
153
  In 
footnote four the majority opened up potential caveats.
154
  First, the Court 
explained, rather cryptically, that “the employer would be liable only when 
the supervisor acts within the scope of his employment, or when the 
supervisor acts outside the scope of his employment and liability would be 
imputed to the employer under traditional agency principles.”155  Given the 
language of USERRA, which covers hiring, rehiring, retention, promotion, 
and benefits of employment, one is hard pressed to think of a situation in 
which a decisionmaker would be acting outside the scope of his or her 
employment and engage in an action that is covered by USERRA.
156
  The 
Court then cited Ellerth.
157
  It is not clear what the Court meant by citing 
                                                          
 147.  Id. at 1189. 
 148.  Id. at 1189–90. 
 149.  Id. at 1193. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id.   
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 1194 n.4. 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id. 
 156.  38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006). 
 157.  Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4. 
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Ellerth, although perhaps a reference to employer grievance mechanisms 
later in the footnote provides some insight.
158
 
The Court later noted that Staub used the employer’s internal 
grievance mechanism, and, citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,
159
 
once again “express[ed] no view as to whether Proctor [the hospital] would 
have an affirmative defense if he [Staub] did not.”160  The issue in Suders 
was whether constructive discharge constituted a tangible employment 
action for which an employer would not be able to use the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense in a sexual harassment case.
161
  The portion of the 
Suders case Justice Scalia cites in Staub is the discussion of the 
circumstances under which an employer will or will not have such a defense 
in a purported constructive discharge scenario.
162
  It is unclear, however, 
what Justice Scalia meant in the context of Staub.  Was he alluding to 
harassment based on military status?  If Justice Scalia meant to suggest an 
Ellerth/Faragher type defense is available when the employee is 
discharged, as was the case for Staub, it would appear to presage an 
extension of the defense to non-harassment employment discrimination 
claims or at least claims that involve the animus of non-decisionmaking 
employees.
163
  The Ellerth/Faragher defense already has proven to be an 
effective tool for granting summary judgment for employers.
164
  In my 
opinion, extending an employer grievance mechanism defense to more 
discrimination claims will allow courts to throw more employment 
discrimination claims out of court before the fact finder can scrutinize the 
discriminatory behavior.  Unlike sexual harassment, a supervisor’s decision 
                                                          
 158.  Id.  
 159.  542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
 160.  Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4. 
 161.  Suders, 542 U.S. at 143. 
 162.  Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4 (citing Suders, 542 U.S. at 148–50). 
 163.  See Suders, 542 U.S. at 150 (“The [First and Seventh Circuits] in Reed and Robinson[, 
respectively,] properly recognized that Ellerth and Faragher, which divided the universe of 
supervisor-harassment claims according to the presence or absence of an official act, mark the 
path constructive discharge claims based on harassing conduct must follow.”).  
 164.  Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 120 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, Using Evidence]; see also 
Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science 
Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 273, 331 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge] (explaining how, 
with respect to the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, “Courts simply have not proven 
to be in the best position to understand the victim’s perspective, especially at the summary 
judgment stage, where many of these cases are decided”); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: 
Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 345 
(1999) (explaining that “on numerous occasions, the defendant employer’s ability to demonstrate 
any sort of remedial action has been treated by district courts as a basis for dismissing the 
plaintiff’s case”). 
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to terminate an employee, even if the discriminatory animus comes from 
non-decisionmaking supervisors, does not have weak links to actions that 
implicate employer behavior.  Indeed, if a decisionmaker is motivated to 
fire a reservist because of biased information from the reservist’s direct 
supervisor or co-worker, what difference does it make whether a grievance 
mechanism is in place?  The employer still has fired the employee because 
of his reservist status. 
The Supreme Court has not yet declared that the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense applies to all employment discrimination claims, but it looks like 
that might be coming.
165
  I believe if the Court does so, this decision will 
make it even more difficult for plaintiffs to get to trial in these cases.  It is 
already difficult to know what is and is not sufficiently harassing to be 
actionable.
166
  In part, this confusion is due to the courts’ reliance on 
employer internal grievance mechanisms, which keep juries away from the 
merits of these cases.
167
  This reliance is particularly problematic in 
harassment cases, because the standard requires that a “reasonable person” 
would find the behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.
168
  While employers complain that 
they do not know what constitutes harassment,
169
 the courts continue to 
refuse to let juries decide cases so that a community standard can evolve.
170
  
As explained later in this Article, this instance is just one in which a 
grievance mechanism outside of the court system leaves society flummoxed 
when it comes to identifying a standard. 
It is also another avenue for privatization, although unlike arbitrations, 
which involve at least purportedly neutral decisionmakers,
171
 this time the 
fox is watching the hen house.
172
  The courts would be giving the process 
over to the employer, not only leaving the process in private hands that are 
unaccountable to the public, but also placing that process in the hands of the 
defendant employer.
173
  As one plaintiff in an employment discrimination 
                                                          
 165.  See supra text accompanying notes 153–164; see also Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 133 S. Ct. 
2434, 2439, 2444 (2013) (narrowing the term “supervisor” in the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative 
defense, thereby requiring defendants to meet the lesser co-worker standard in more cases). 
 166.  Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 24, at 820. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 169.  See Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 24, at 791–92 (noting that human resources 
professionals complain that there is no clear definition of what constitutes sexual harassment). 
 170.  Id. at 820. 
 171.  See infra text accompanying notes 338–340 (describing problems with repeat players).  
 172.  See Lawton, supra note 136, at 838 (stating that employers hold the power to control 
their liability by using internal grievance mechanisms). 
 173.  See id. (describing how employers have shaped workplace sexual harassment 
procedures). 
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suit put it: “I went [to the company’s internal EEO office], and of course 
they said they were going to investigate, but how do you investigate 
yourself? . . .  There’s not an outside [agency] doing it.  [The employer is] 
doing it.”174  As Nielsen and Nelson sum up, “even those employees who 
take formal actions inside their company are likely to confront a corporate 
culture with a vested interest in transforming their claim from 
discrimination to something else.”175 
C.  The Procedure Lane 
The previous section alluded to the use of the procedural device of 
summary judgment to dispose of employment discrimination claims.  
Commentators have described this phenomenon in the context of sexual 
harassment cases and other sex discrimination cases.
176
  Recently, Professor 
Elizabeth Schneider has accounted for the various ways courts use pretrial 
procedure to send employment discrimination plaintiffs out of court.
177
  
Professor Schneider looks specifically at pleading requirements, summary 
judgment, and the evidentiary burden established for scientific evidence by 
the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
178
 line of cases.
179
  
                                                          
 174.  Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Laura Beth Nielsen, Situated Justice: A Contextual 
Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 1, 16 (2012). 
 175.  Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, at 686.  
 176.  See, e.g., John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors and the Disappearance of “Vicarious” 
Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose 
Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 
1401, 1404 (2002) (arguing that many lower courts have “emasculated” the Ellerth/Faragher rule 
in order to dismiss harassment cases by granting summary judgment); Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 
705, 705–06 (2007) (exploring the relationship between grants of summary judgment and sex 
discrimination cases); Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 24, at 72 (stating that 
it is becoming more common to grant summary judgment in claims of harassment brought under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Medina, supra note 164, at 315 (stating that in 
situations constituting a hostile environment, courts often grant summary judgment due to their 
“discomfort with the perceived lack of an injury to the victim”); Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, 
at 675–80 (describing how case law generally makes it more difficult for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs). 
 177.  See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 
517, 518–19 (2010) (noting that “[j]udicial gatekeeping is happening at an earlier stage than ever 
before” and “the greatest impact of this change . . . is the dismissal of civil rights and employment 
discrimination cases from federal courts in disproportionate numbers”). 
 178.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 179.  Schneider, supra note 177, at 551–55 (discussing Daubert motions); see also Erica 
Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1656 (2000) (stating that the “Supreme Court’s evidentiary trilogy”—
Daubert, Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
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Schneider suggests that the cumulative effect of shifts in these areas results 
in increased settlements and fewer trials in these cases.
180
 
In the pretrial context, the most recent cases that have undermined the 
ability of a plaintiff to remain in court are 2007’s Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly
181
 and 2009’s Ashcroft v. Iqbal.182  These cases effectively 
changed the pleading standard set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a) from the minimal notice pleading standard
183
 to requiring a plaintiff to 
plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’”184  For over fifty years, the reigning 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 was set out in the 
Court’s 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson.185  In that case, the Court 
explained that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”186  After 
Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain facts that provide a 
plausible basis for relief.
187
  Courts must disregard legal conclusions if not 
supported by factual allegations.
188
  The “possibility” of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing is insufficient to withstand this new pleading standard.
189
  The 
                                                          
526 U.S. 137 (1999)—has made an “important contribution toward rationalizing the jurisprudence 
of scientific evidence”). 
 180.  Schneider, supra note 177, at 523.  Clermont and Schwab’s data show that there are 
actually more trials and likely fewer settlements in employment discrimination cases than other 
federal civil cases.  See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 122, 123 disp. 
9.  The percentage of employment discrimination cases that are resolved by trial has fallen from 
18.2% in 1979 to 2.8% in 2006.  There are, however, more trials in employment discrimination 
cases than other areas of federal civil practice, where the trial rates have fallen from 6.2% in 1979 
to 1% in 2006.  See id. at 123 disp. 9.  
 181.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 182.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 183.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) states that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief 
must contain . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief[.]”  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A 
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010) (examining the 
history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in 
Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 535 (2001) (“The 1938 Rules 
liberalized the rules of pleading and joinder . . . making it easier for litigants, even those of modest 
means and limited expertise, to have their day in court.”). 
 184.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 185.  355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 186.  Id. at 45–46. 
 187.  See supra text accompanying note 184. 
 188.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 
 189.  Id. at 679 (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the 
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))). 
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Court in both cases looked for other explanations for the defendant’s 
behavior in determining whether the plaintiff’s allegations stated a 
“plausible” claim for relief.190  The Court adopted this fact-based 
requirement in spite of the Court’s purpose in adopting notice pleading in 
modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 being to avoid the problems 
associated with fact pleading.
191
 
Commentators already have begun to examine the implications of the 
Twombly and Iqbal decisions on employment discrimination claims.
192
  
While early studies showed a “modest” increase in the granting of motions 
to dismiss post-Twombly,
193
 a more recent study conducted by Professor 
Raymond Brescia suggests that once the Court decided Iqbal, there was a 
distinct change in motion to dismiss practice in employment discrimination 
cases.
194
  Professor Brescia’s study examined the effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal on dismissals in civil rights/employment cases as well as fair housing 
cases in which a defendant argued that there was a problem with the 
specificity of the facts alleged in the complaint.
195
  Brescia’s study found 
that Iqbal had a significant effect on dismissal rates.  In the 41-month 
period prior to Twombly, sixty-one percent of motions to dismiss were 
                                                          
 190.  See id. at 682 (arguing that non-invidious theories for the defendants’ actions were that 
they wished to detain illegal aliens and find those involved in the 9/11 attacks); Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (equally plausible explanation for defendants’ 
actions in antitrust case was that they were engaging in parallel conduct to compete with each 
other).   
 191.  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48 (explaining that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach 
that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome 
and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the 
merits”); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the history of 
Rule 8(a)); J. Scott Pritchard, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of 
Twombly and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and 
Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 759–60 (2011) (describing the history of federal 
pleading standards). 
 192.  See, e.g., Michael O’Neil, Note, Twombly and Iqbal: Effects on Hostile Work 
Environment Claims, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 151, 154, 175–76 (2012) (expressing concern that 
recent judicial interpretations of Twombly and Iqbal could lead to more dismissals of hostile 
environment sexual harassment cases). 
 193.  See Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1030 tbl.A (2009).  This study of 
Title VII, ADA and ADEA claims that showed pre-Twombly, 54.5% of motions to dismiss were 
granted and 20.9% were granted in part, for a total of 75.4%.  Id.  Post-Twombly, 57.1% were 
granted, and 20.5% were granted in part, for a total of 77.6%.  Id. 
 194.  See Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in 
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 239 (2012) (noting “that 
the number of dismissals on the grounds that the pleadings were not sufficiently specific has risen 
dramatically after [Iqbal], a fact that is missed by looking solely at dismissal rates, and not the 
volume of dismissals”). 
 195.  See id. at 262 (discussing the methodology of dismissal rates study). 
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granted.
196
  In the 24-month period between Twombly and Iqbal, courts’ 
granting of motions to dismiss actually decreased: only fifty-seven percent 
of motions to dismiss were granted.
197
  Post-Iqbal, however, dismissal rates 
changed markedly.  In the 19-month period following Iqbal, courts granted 
motions to dismiss in seventy-two percent of the cases studied.
198
  While the 
study only considered electronically reported trial court cases,
199
 the study’s 
focus on decisions in which these specific cases appear to be having an 
impact makes it more helpful than those studies that look at motions to 
dismiss more generally.
200




What is perhaps more disturbing is that the number of cases in which 
defendants have made these motions has accelerated considerably after 
Iqbal.  Brescia plots this information by quarter, beginning with 2004 and 
ending with the third quarter of 2010.
202
  The number of decisions in the 
first quarter of 2004 that addressed a motion to dismiss based on the 
specificity of the pleadings was twelve.
203
  By the third quarter of 2010, 
courts issued sixty-one decisions.
204
  As Brescia points out, this is a greater 
than five hundred percent increase.
205
 This dramatic rise occurred in spite of 
no marked increase in federal case filings involving these causes of 
action.
206
  This increase logically means that plaintiffs now are fighting 
                                                          
 196.  Id. at 262, 269 tbl.1.  
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id.  Brescia also tracked dismissals with prejudice, which showed a similar pattern, but 
the results were not statistically significant.  Id. at 270 tbl.2, 291 app. C.  Likewise, dismissal rates 
were particularly high for pro se plaintiffs, with courts granting seventy-four percent of motions 
and granting fifty-nine percent at least in part with prejudice in the 41-month period post-Iqbal.  
Id. at 272 tbl.4.  Once again, these findings were not statistically significant.  Id. at 291 app. C. 
 199.  Id. at 241.   
 200.  Id. at 239.  Motions to dismiss can be based on matters extraneous to the Twombly/Iqbal 
standard, such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies or statutes of limitations.  Id.  
Twombly and Iqbal would not have an effect on motions based on these and similar grounds.  Id.  
 201.  See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96 
JUDICATURE 127, 127–29, 132 (2012) (discussing a study of federal district court opinions on 
Westlaw that revealed a statistically significant increase in dismissal rates and more sizable 
increase in dismissal rates based on factual insufficiency).  
 202.  Brescia, supra note 194, at 281, 282 tbl.9. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. at 282 tbl.9. 
 205.  Id. at 281. 
 206.  Id. at 283, 289–90 app. B.  While employment discrimination filings went up slightly 
during the study period, housing discrimination claims fell slightly.  Id.  In addition, employment 
discrimination case terminations are generally down. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to 
Worse, supra note 6, at 116 disp. 5, 117 (showing a drop in terminations from a high of 23,722 in 
1998 to 15,007 in 2007).  In terms of the federal civil docket load, employment discrimination 
cases went from nearly ten percent of case terminations in 2001 to fewer than six percent by 2006.  
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more motions to dismiss, further increasing the costs of this litigation for 
the party least likely to possess sufficient wealth to handle additional costs.  
The higher costs of litigation in turn increases costs for lawyers, who often 
take employment discrimination cases in reliance on the fee-generating 
nature of these claims, making it more costly to litigate these cases.
207
  
Likewise, the total number of cases dismissed and dismissed with prejudice 
(as opposed to the percentages) increased “exponentially” after Iqbal.208  It 
is little wonder that Professor Suja Thomas has referred to the motion to 
dismiss as the “new summary judgment motion.”209 
In addition to the motion to dismiss, there is another significant motion 
that commonly leaves plaintiffs on the courthouse steps: the summary 
judgment motion.  Many commentators have expressed concern that courts 
are too eager to grant summary judgment in employment discrimination 
cases.
210
  Recently, studies have begun to show the significance of this 
                                                          
See id. at 117.  In terms of case filings, Nielsen et al. report that the number of employment 
discrimination filings peaked in 1997 at 23,796 and have been declining ever since, with the filing 
rate declining to 14,353 in 2006.  LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND., CONTESTING 
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1987–2003 (2008), 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen_abf_edl_report_08_final.
pdf.   
 207.  Nancy L. Lane, After Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Providing 
Attorney’s Fees to Plaintiffs in Mixed Motive Age Discrimination Cases, 3 ELDER L.J. 341, 349–
350 (1995) (“[B]ecause civil rights plaintiffs often are not in a financial position to pursue an 
employment discrimination suit, including attorney’s fees in the recovery gives attorneys an 
incentive to represent these plaintiffs.”). 
 208.  Brescia, supra note 194, at 282, 283 tbl.10. 
 209.  Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under 
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010).  At least some in the Senate 
have suggested that the old notice pleading rule be restored.  See Notice Pleading Restoration Act 
of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. §2 (2009) (putting forth that “[f]ederal courts shall not dismiss a 
complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the 
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957)”); Pritchard, supra note 191, at 757–58 (describing legislative efforts, including the Notice 
Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, to move away from the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard 
reforms). 
 210.  See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper 
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206 (1993) 
(examining the “gradual and continuing erosion of the factfinder’s role in federal employment 
discrimination cases and its replacement by an increasing use of summary judgment through 
which courts make pretrial determinations”); Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 24, at 805–
09 (discussing articles finding that courts favor granting pretrial motion practice in employment 
discrimination cases, particularly in the instances of sexual harassment claims); Medina, supra 
note 164, at 313–14 (arguing that federal courts are increasingly turning to “granting summary 
judgment to employers accused of employment discrimination on the basis of sex”); Schneider, 
supra note 177, at 537–40 (discussing the increasingly higher rates of summary judgment in the 
employment discrimination context, contrasted with the historical disfavoring of summary 
judgment).  
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problem.  Professor Joseph Seiner conducted a study of summary judgment 
motions in all employment discrimination cases terminated in fiscal year 
2006 in which a defendant made a motion for summary judgment.
211
  Seiner 
derived his study’s data from the Federal Judicial Center, and as such, it is 
not simply limited to those cases that were reported either officially or 
electronically.
212
  Of the 3,983 summary judgment orders issued in these 
cases, courts granted 62.6% of the motions, granted 18.2% in part, and 
denied only 19.2%.
213
  Thus, in over eighty percent of the cases in which a 
defendant made such a motion, it was granted in whole or in part.
214
 
While Seiner’s study does not provide information about how many 
defendants in employment discrimination cases make summary judgment 
motions, anecdotal as well as other evidence suggests they are frequent.
215
  
Professor Vivian Berger, a certified mediator, has noted that most 
employer’s counsels state that they will file a summary judgment motion if 
                                                          
 211.  Seiner, supra note 193, at 1033. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. at 1033 tbl.C. 
 214.  Id. Neilsen et al. found in a study of 1788 cases filed from 1987 to 2003 an average of 
eighteen percent of cases were lost on a motion to dismiss and sixteen percent on a motion for 
summary judgment.  See NIELSEN ET AL., supra note 206, at 2, 29.  Clermont and Schwab found 
that pretrial dispositions, which include motions, were at about twenty percent in 2006—not much 
different than the pretrial disposition rates for other federal civil cases.  See Clermont & Schwab, 
From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 122–23 disp. 9.  An earlier study by Theodore Eisenberg and 
Charlotte Lanvers attempted to assess the effect of the game-changing 1986 summary judgment 
trilogy—Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242 (1986), and Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)—on summary judgment 
rates.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across 
Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 
(Cornell Law School, Research Paper No. 08-022, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138373.  Studying three federal district 
courts—the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of Georgia, and the Central 
District of Florida—they found a marked increase (nearly doubling) in summary judgment rates in 
employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of Georgia.  Id. at 16.  The summary 
judgment rates in employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of Georgia reached 
almost twenty-five percent for cases terminated in 2001–02.  Id.  While there was not a similar 
increase for other categories or other districts, the rate increased in other civil rights cases in the 
Northern District of Georgia.  Id.  This increase, however, was not statistically significant.  Id.  
 215.  See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment 
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 
48 (2005) (noting that “most employers’ counsel say during mediation that they intend to file a 
‘Rule 56’ motion if the case does not settle; and at least in the Southern and Eastern Districts of 
New York, a large number of employers do so” (internal citation omitted)); Lawrence D. 
Rosenthal, Motions for Summary Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justifications for 
Adverse Employment Actions: Why the Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 
335, 336 (2002) (explaining that “[a]fter the conclusion of discovery in most employment 
discrimination lawsuits, employers file motions for summary judgment to dispose of the litigation 
prior to trial”).  But see supra note 214 (describing studies that suggest summary judgment rates, 
overall, are not much higher in employment discrimination cases than other civil cases). 
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their case does not settle.
216
  Likewise, using data from fiscal year 2006, the 
Federal Judicial Center took a random sample of 1500 cases from most of 
the United States district courts.
217
  The Center designed the study to 
determine the impact on summary judgment practice in federal courts based 
on the structure of summary judgment motions, if any, set out in local 
rules.
218
  The study found that in thirty-five percent and thirty-seven percent 
of employment discrimination cases studied (depending on summary 
judgment motion structure), defendants filed at least one summary 
judgment motion.
219
  This number is quite a higher percentage of motions in 
employment discrimination than other types of cases.  For example, 
defendants moved for summary judgment in ten percent and fourteen 
percent (depending on structure) of contracts cases and nine percent and 
eleven percent (depending on structure) of torts cases.
220
  Indeed, of the 
categories of cases studied (contracts, torts, employment discrimination, 
other civil rights, and other), employment discrimination cases had the 
highest percentage of defendant’s filing at least one summary judgment 
motion.
221
  Not surprisingly, employment discrimination cases also had the 
highest percentage of courts granting such motions in whole or in part.
222
  
Thus, the anecdotal evidence is borne out by this study.  Defendants appear 
to make motions for summary judgment more often in employment 
discrimination cases when compared to other types of civil filings, and 
courts are granting them. 
Of course, this leads to the question of whether lawyers who handle 
employment discrimination cases simply are bringing weaker cases than 
lawyers who handle other areas of the law.  Intuitively, it does not seem 
                                                          
 216.  Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 215, at 48. 
 217.  See generally Joe Cecil & George Cort, Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across 
Districts with Variations in Local Rules, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Aug. 13, 2008, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/sujulrs2.pdf (discussing a study 
designed to determine if the manner in which movant and non-movant proceed with motions for 
summary judgment, based on local rules, appeared to impact outcomes of summary judgment 
motions).  The study did not include certain types of cases, such as class actions, or cases from 
three district courts from which it could not obtain usable data (Western District of Wisconsin, 
District of the Northern Marianas Islands, and the District of the Virgin Islands).  Id. at 4.  
 218.  Id. at 1. 
 219.  Id. at 12 tbl.7.  The percentage of employment discrimination plaintiffs filing summary 
judgment motions was decidedly low—three percent of employment discrimination cases.  Id. at 
13 tbl.8.   
 220.  Id. at 12 tbl.7.  
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 16 tbl.11.  Depending on the structure of the summary judgment motion, the courts 
granted such motions either twenty percent of the time or sixteen percent of the time in the cases 
studied.  Id.  Taking contracts cases again as point of comparison, such motions were granted in 
whole or in part in only six percent or seven percent of contracts cases studied.  Id.  
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obvious why plaintiff’s lawyers in this area would do so.223  Employment 
discrimination plaintiffs are not known as particularly wealthy clientele.
224
  
As noted earlier, plaintiff’s lawyers bring these cases with the hope of an 
award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, as provided by statute.225  
Thus, lawyers have a significant financial incentive to take cases that they 
have a realistic possibility of winning.
226
  While it is possible that lawyers 
bring weaker cases in hope of a quick settlement, there does not seem to be 
a logical reason why lawyers would bring weaker cases in this area than 
they would in another area that involves frequently similar risky 
compensation—contingent fees generated in tort cases.  Yet the study above 
shows far fewer motions for summary judgment in torts cases.
227
  This 
disparity suggests that there is significant disagreement in employment 
discrimination cases between the plaintiff’s bar and defense bar regarding 
what is a worthwhile case.  At this point, the federal judiciary is siding 
more with the defense bar in employment discrimination than it is in other 
areas of the law.
228
 
Plaintiffs fare no better in the federal appellate courts, where the courts 
are far more likely to reverse plaintiffs’ victories on appeal than defendants’ 
victories.  In their study of employment discrimination cases in the federal 
courts, Clermont and Schwab found that the reversal rate for defendants 
who appeal a plaintiff victory in the trial court is 41.10%, whereas the 
plaintiffs’ reversal rate when they appeal a defendant’s trial court victory is 
8.72%.
229
  As they note, plaintiffs’ chances of retaining a victory on appeal 
“cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a coin flip[,]” whereas 
                                                          
 223.  Clermont & Schwab play devil’s advocate and argue that it is possible that plaintiffs 
bring weaker cases in the employment discrimination context as a potential explanation for the 
poor plaintiff win rates in these types of cases on appeal in federal court. Clermont & Schwab, 
From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 114 n.34.  They subsequently reject this counterargument.  
See id. (“It merits stressing that we have never claimed that our attitudinal explanation of the anti-
plaintiff effect is irrefutable. . . . [A]lthough we concede that this counterargument is coherent, we 
maintain that it is unconvincing in [the employment discrimination] setting for a number of 
reasons.”); see also Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, at 670 (recounting a case in which the judge 
was skeptical of classwide discrimination).  But see Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent 
Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 482–83 
(2008) (arguing that judicial aversion to these claims is a result of caseload, not ideology).  
 224.  See Lane, supra note 207. 
 225.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), 2000e-5(k) (2006). 
 226.  See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 126, at 1027 (survey of employment lawyers showing that 
they are reluctant to take cases that do not have strong evidence of discrimination because of 
defendants’ advantages in these cases).  
 227.  Cecil & Cort, supra note 217, at 16 tbl.11.   
 228.  See generally Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 104 (reporting 
at the outset its “concluding view that results in the federal courts disfavor employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, who are now forswearing use of those courts”).   
 229.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 110 disp. 2. 
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defendants who prevail at trial “can be assured of retaining that victory after 
appeal.”230  Clermont and Schwab explain that this discrepancy in reversals 
after trial on the merits is particularly disturbing because the issues of intent 
relevant in these cases usually entail judgments about witness credibility—
something appellate courts should not be second-guessing on appeal.
231
 
Some commentators have suggested that the disparate rates of reversal 
for plaintiffs’ and defendants’ respective appeals in employment 
discrimination cases are the result of judicial hostility to civil rights 
cases.
232
 Indeed, former federal district court judge Nancy Gertner 
described her experience: 
Federal courts, I believe, were hostile to discrimination cases.  
Although the judges may have thought they were entirely 
unbiased, the outcomes of those cases told a different story.  The 
law judges felt “compelled” to apply had become increasingly 
problematic.  Changes in substantive discrimination law since the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were tantamount to a 




Gertner posits that judges’ approaches to employment discrimination 
cases are skewed by the cases that they see, that is, the cases that do not 
settle.  Because judges feel that the best cases settle, they come to believe 
that all employment discrimination cases are weak and that there is no 
significant need for anti-discrimination law.
234
  This attitude, combined with 
asymmetric decisionmaking, whereby judges write detailed decisions when 
they grant summary judgment but do not write opinions when they deny the 
motions, results in judges adopting what Gertner characterizes as “[l]osers’ 
[r]ules”—manipulations of the legal rules to get rid of these cases by 
granting motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.
235
  Indeed, 
Gertner relates that in the beginning of her judicial career, “the trainer 
                                                          
 230.  Id. at 112; see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for 
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 107 tbl.I, 108 (1999) (reporting similar findings in a 
study of ADA cases in several federal circuits).  
 231.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 112. 
 232.  See, e.g., id. at 112 (identifying an “anti-plaintiff affect” in the federal appellate courts).  
Further, plaintiffs in these cases have one of the worst win rates of all civil cases.  Id. at 113.  
Clermont and Schwab attribute this in part to “attitudinal explanation[s].”  Id. at 112.  But see 
Reeves, supra note 223, at 482–83 (arguing that low plaintiff win rates in employment 
discrimination cases should not be attributed to judicial attitudes and general ideology toward 
these types of cases, instead advocating for an approach that considers judges’ workloads as part 
of an apparent anti-plaintiff bias). 
 233.  Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 109 (2012) (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted).  
 234.  Id. at 111–12, 114–15. 
 235.  Id. at 110. 
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teaching discrimination law to new judges announced, ‘Here’s how to get 
rid of civil rights cases . . . .’”236 
I would take Gertner’s argument one step further.  While good cases 
used to settle, emboldened by success in motion practice, defense lawyers 
have stopped trying to settle cases that formerly would reach early 
settlement.  In fact, given the prevalence of defendants’ success using 
motions, defense counsel would be foolish not to attempt motions to 
dismiss and/or summary judgment.
237
  Whatever the reason, procedural 
devices such as motions to dismiss and summary judgment are fruitful 
avenues for defendants to use to take these cases out of the court system. 
D.  The Mediation and Settlement Lanes 
The EEOC increasingly has encouraged mediation, which, if 
successful, results in a settlement much like a lawyer-negotiated settlement 
prior to trial, as a means of resolving employment discrimination suits.  It is 
estimated that fifty percent of employment discrimination suits settle.
238
  
Clermont and Schwab’s study demonstrates that while fewer employment 
discrimination cases settle early in the litigation compared to other cases, 
the majority of these cases ultimately settle.
239
  Scholars have identified 
many arguments in favor of mediation and settlement as viable means of 
resolving these disputes, especially if the employee wishes to continue to 
work for the same employer.
240
  Indeed, a study of the EEOC’s mediation 
                                                          
 236.  Id. at 117. 
 237.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 121.  Specifically, Clermont 
and Schwab’s research reflects that “employment discrimination plaintiffs manage fewer 
resolutions early in litigation compared to other plaintiffs, and so they have to proceed toward trial 
more often.  Defendants’ resistance reflects awareness of their good chances in court.”  Id. 
 238.  See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 24.  The authors also report that most 
of the remaining cases are decided on procedural grounds.  Id.; see also Nielsen & Nelson, supra 
note 4, at 695–96 figs.3 & 4 (illustrating that forty-three percent of employment discrimination 
cases settled in 2001). 
 239.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 122–23 n.57 (finding that 
36.66% of jobs cases settle early in the litigation, whereas 58.57% of nonjobs cases settle early, 
thus illustrating that “far fewer employment discrimination cases end early in the litigation 
process”). 
 240.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution Conflict as Pathology: An 
Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (1997) [hereinafter Delgado, Conflict as 
Pathology] (noting that mediation can be faster, less expensive, and more cooperative, despite 
ultimately pointing out problems with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); Richard 
Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1366 (1985) [hereinafter Delgado et al., Fairness and 
Formality] (noting the informality of the ADR process and therefore its accessibility); Trina 
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548–50 
(1991) (identifying arguments in favor of mediation).   
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program showed high participant satisfaction with the program.
241
  It is not 
the purpose of this Article to debate the pros and cons of mediation in this 
context, as scholars have done in many articles.
242
 Instead, once again, this 
section will point out that mediation and its concomitant settlement are on 
the rise, leaving fewer cases for courts to resolve. 
The EEOC’s mediation program provides an example.  EEOC 
statistics show that the EEOC has been conducting more and more 
mediations and resolving more and more cases using mediation since 
1999.
243
  In 1999, the EEOC conducted 7,397 mediations and resolved 
4,833 cases.
244
  By fiscal year 2010, that number had risen to 12,755 
mediations, with mediations resolving 9,362 cases.
245
  The rate of resolution 
using mediation has risen as well, beginning with a 65.3% resolution rate in 
1999 to an all-time high resolution rate of 73.4% of cases in fiscal year 
2010.
246
  This rate is a much larger number than the number of cases the 
EEOC files in court.  To illustrate, in fiscal year 2011, the EEOC filed only 
300 suits and 261 on the merits.
247
  This disparity occurred at a time when 
                                                          
 241.  E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, AN EVALUATION OF THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM 1, 4–5 (2000), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/report/index.html.  
 242.  See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 240, at 1548–49 (advocating that mediation “rejects an 
objectivist approach to conflict resolution,” the process is “cooperative and voluntary, not 
coercive[,]” “decisions supposedly may be informed by context rather than by abstract 
principle[,]” and that “emotions are recognized and incorporated” into the [] process”); see also 
Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving 
Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 150–56 (1999) (promoting 
mediation in the context of workplace sexual harassment claims); Susan K. Hippensteele, 
Mediation Ideology: Navigating Space from Myth to Reality in Sexual Harassment Dispute 
Resolution, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 43, 46 (2006) (suggesting that “the sudden and 
dramatic shift in public awareness and attitudes toward sexual harassment and the sharp increase 
in sexual harassment complaint reporting following the Thomas hearings” adequately explains the 
rise in ADR as a mechanism for “re-privatizing sexual harassment”); Mori Irvine, Mediation: Is It 
Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 27 (1993) 
(explaining that mediation has been “successful in providing a forum for cases that do not warrant 
the time and expense of an arbitration hearing”); Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and 
Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 597–608 (1999) (outlining reasons why mediation 
might improve Title VII enforcement).  Mediation appears to be especially controversial in the 
sexual harassment context, e.g., Hippensteele, supra, as well as for members of traditionally 
disempowered groups, such as women.  See Grillo, supra note 240, at 1549–50 (arguing that 
compulsory mediation can be destructive to many women).   
 243.  The precise number of mediations conducted from 1999 to 2012 is 159,760.  EQUAL 
EMP. OPP. COMM’N, EEOC MEDIATION STATISTICS FY 1999 THROUGH FY 2012, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/mediation_stats.cfm [hereinafter EEOC MEDIATION 
STATISTICS] (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).   
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY 1997 THROUGH FY 
2013, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).  
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charge filing was at an all-time high; in fiscal year 2011, complainants filed 
nearly 100,000 charges with the EEOC.
248
  One might assume that the 
increase in mediations is a result of the increase in charge filings.  Statistics 
show, however, that the EEOC mediated 10% of charges in 1999, whereas 
13% of charges were mediated in 2010.
249
  The number of charges resolved 
through mediation likewise rose by 3%—from 6% of charges in 1999 and 
9% of charges in 2010.
250
  The EEOC has entered into some 200 
agreements with large employers that create standing agreements that the 
particular employer will use the EEOC’s mediation program to resolve 
charges.
251
  In addition, local EEOC district offices have entered into more 
than 1,500 such mediation agreements.
252
 
The EEOC’s success in resolving charges has increased over the years, 
with some intermittent variations.  Overall, by comparing 1997 to 2011 
statistics, it appears that the EEOC is resolving more charges through 
settlement, resulting in the withdrawal of charges with benefits to the 
charging party.  For example, in 1997, 3.8% of the resolutions occurred by 
settlement, whereas 9.1% of charges were resolved by settlement in fiscal 
year 2011.
253
  In some of the years between, settlement rates rose as high as 
                                                          
According to the EEOC’s website, “[m]erits suits include direct suits and interventions alleging 
violations of the substantive provisions of the statutes enforced by the Commission and suits to 
enforce administrative settlements.”  Id.   
 248.  EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2013, 
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [hereinafter EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS] 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014).  
 249.  This statistic was calculated by dividing the number of mediations in 1999 (7397) by the 
number of charges filed in 1999 (77,444).  Similarly, for 2010, the number of mediations for that 
year (12,755) was divided by the number of charges filed for 2010 (99,922).  EEOC MEDIATION 
STATISTICS, supra note 243; EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS, supra note 248. 
 250.  This statistic was calculated by dividing the number of charges resolved by mediation in 
1999 (4,833) by the number of charges filed in 1999 (77,444).  Similarly, for 2010, the number of 
charges resolved by mediation for that year (9,362) was divided by the number of charges filed for 
2010 (99,922).  EEOC MEDIATION STATISTICS, supra note 243; EEOC CHARGES STATISTICS, 
supra note 248. 
 251.  Press Release, Equal Emp. Opp. Comm’n, EEOC and CVS Caremark Sign National 
Mediation Agreement (June 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-29-10b.cfm.  
 252.  See id. (noting that the EEOC has created a universal agreement to mediate to facilitate 
employers’ entering into mediation agreements); see also EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, 
UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT TO MEDIATE, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/universal_agreement.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) 
(showing same).   
 253.  EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, ALL STATUTES FY 1997–FY 2012, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).  
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12.2%.
254
  Similarly, 3.4% of charges were withdrawn with benefits to the 
charging party in 1997, whereas 5.1% were withdrawn in 2011.
255
 
The above data shows that employment discrimination charges 
commonly end by resolution through settlement or mediated settlement and 
that the EEOC’s emphasis on mediations has increased recently.  Like other 
avenues examined,
256
 this practice results in cases being taken out of the 
public view that is the court system. 
III.  SOME PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZATION AND THE VANISHING TRIAL 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident employment 
discrimination plaintiffs are having a tough time getting their suits into 
court and remaining there.
257
  Although this position is not without 
controversy,
258
 Professor Marc Galanter has documented the overall 
phenomenon of the “vanishing trial” and has argued that this trend is 
problematic for a number of reasons.
259
  In a similar vein, in his 
groundbreaking 1984 article, Against Settlement, Professor Owen Fiss 
suggested that the then-burgeoning alternative dispute resolution system, 
where many employment discrimination claims are now resolved, is also 
problematic due to issues surrounding settlement.
260
  The positions of these 
scholars, however, are not without their detractors, including those who 
have noted that trials were never all that prevalent.
261
 
                                                          
 254.  Id.  This rate was for fiscal year 2007.  The rate was actually down slightly from prior 
years in 2011. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  See supra Part II.B. 
 257.  See Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 6, at 958 (remarking that “prisoners 
have less difficulty maintaining their trial victories than do nonprisoner civil rights plaintiffs”). 
 258.  For example, Gillian Hadfield disagrees with some of the data on vanishing trials relied 
upon by Professor Galanter; in particular, Hadfield argues that there are problems with the data in 
this area because the courts count cases as “terminated” that might not be concluded.  Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical 
Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 705, 
709 (2004).  Hadfield also believes there are problems with coding cases.  Id. at 711–12, 713 tbl.1.  
 259.  Galanter, supra note 9, at 29–33.  
 260.  Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1073–75 (arguing that, as a general premise, 
settlement should be treated as a “highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets”).  
 261.  See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. 
STUD. 689, 689, 691 (2000) (arguing that trials have never been the “norm” and that “[c]ivil trials 
do not make much of a mark on popular culture”); Hadfield, supra note 258, at 714–15 (arguing 
that the number of cases terminated by jury trial since 1979 has been “relatively stable”).  For 
purposes of employment discrimination suits, jury trials did not become available until the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006).  Thus, earlier data 
regarding jury trials is inapplicable to the cases discussed here because jury trials simply were not 
available to plaintiffs in those cases.   
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In employment discrimination cases specifically, commentators have 
expressed concern that plaintiffs experience double harm as they are 
harmed at the hands of their employers and by the legal system’s treatment 
of their cases.
262
  Given the prevalent judicial hostility in this context, these 
plaintiffs may fare better before juries, by settling a case before filing suit, 
or at least settling before motion practice begins.
263
  One could then 
reasonably argue that it may not be such a bad thing that employment 
discrimination cases are being resolved in other arenas besides the legal 
system.
264
  While this argument certainly would favor plaintiffs settling 
these cases, it does not address the experiences of plaintiffs who brought 
cases to court and watched as their claims were thrown out on motions to 




This Part examines the problems with the many paths that lead 
plaintiffs out of the courts by examining settlements, arbitration, and 
internal employer grievance mechanisms.
266
  It then suggests that trials have 
                                                          
 262.  See, e.g., Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 15 (study of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, lawyers, and employer representatives in which researchers noted 
“[p]laintiffs frequently narrate their experiences of the law as financially devastating, emotionally 
wrenching, and personally damaging”).  Former federal district court judge Nancy Gertner and 
Melissa Hart refer to the two stories discrimination lawsuits tell—one about discrimination by the 
employer and the other about potential discrimination by the judge.  Nancy Gertner & Melissa 
Hart, Employment Law: Implicit Bias in Employment Litigation, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW 80, 87 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).  This second story 
involves not only the bias of the judge in viewing the facts but also the development of legal 
doctrine that is biased against plaintiffs.  See id. at 87. 
 263.  See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 7 (finding most individuals are 
dissatisfied when their disputes are “transformed by lawyers” and the court system); see also 
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 130 (in a study of federal employment 
discrimination cases from 1979 to 2006, plaintiffs won in trials before juries 37.63% of the time, 
whereas they won in bench trials 19.62% of the time). 
 264.  See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 5 (noting that absent fair process, 
confidence is lost “in the ability of legal institutions to resolve future grievances,” creating 
legitimacy issues and undermining future legal behavior). 
 265.  Indeed, even plaintiffs who settle using the EEOC conciliation or mediation program 
often receive nothing.  EEOC MEDIATION STATISTICS, supra note 243 (showing that between 
1999 and 2012, anywhere from 912 to 1285 mediations resulted in no monetary benefits to the 
complainant). 
 266.  There is a large body of literature canvassing the debate about the vanishing trial, 
including whether it is actually vanishing and whether or not this is a good thing.  See supra notes 
258, 261; see also Hadfield, supra note 258, at 709 (illustrating how changes in statistical 
reporting and court management practices could account for this phenomenon).  In addition, there 
are many legal scholars who have addressed problems related to arbitration and mediation of 
employment disputes.  See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-
Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58, 67–68 
(2007) [hereinafter Green, Measures to Encourage] (describing the various disadvantages facing 
both employers and employees in arbitration); Michael Z. Green, Tackling Employment 
Discrimination with ADR: Does Mediation Offer a Shield for the Haves or Real Opportunity for 
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benefits, both private and public, that litigants should consider before 
abandoning them completely.
267
  It ends with a bit of a reality check.  Right 
now, plaintiffs are not faring well in the legal system.
268
  But is the real 
solution to take cases out of the adjudicatory system or rather to suggest 
corrections that might make the system more just? 
There is an obvious reason why plaintiffs avoid the legal system.
269
  
Empirical studies have shown employment discrimination plaintiffs do not 
fare well in court.
270
  In addition to losing their claim, they also experience 
incredible personal upheaval and disappointment when their cases do not 
turn out as they had hoped.
271
  Indeed, Clermont and Schwab’s study of 
federal court employment discrimination cases saw a distinct drop in the 
number of terminations between 2001 and 2006—from ten percent of 
terminations in 2001 to six percent in 2006.
272
  Clermont and Schwab 
suggest that the decline results from plaintiffs and their lawyers filing fewer 
cases due to their dim prospects for success in federal court.
273
 
In their study of participants in employment discrimination cases, 
Berrey, Hoffman and Nielsen detail the difficulties facing plaintiffs in the 
                                                          
the Have-Nots, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 347–53 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Tackling 
Employment Discrimination] (commenting on the inherent power imbalances in arbitration); Matt 
A. Mayer, The Use of Mediation in Employment Discrimination Cases, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 153, 
164–66 (1999) (discussing the potential disadvantages for mediating employment discrimination 
claims); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 457 (1999) (explaining that “[a]rbitration fails the public because it 
does not further the basic objective of the statute” while litigation fails because it is an expensive 
and lengthy process); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing 
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1482–89 
(2004) (stating that three factors—the societal interests in eliminating discrimination, tension 
between public and private goals, and the impact of societal/individual tension—make 
employment discrimination suits particularly difficult to resolve).  It is not my intent to address all 
the arguments surrounding each of these areas of debate.  Instead, I will suggest why the many 
lanes that lead employment discrimination claims out of court are a cause for concern. 
 267.  See generally David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 2619, 2623 (1995) (noting that developing the advocacy skills of litigants serves both private 
and public goods); Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1085 (describing some benefits of 
public adjudication, including the growth of court interpretations of legal doctrine). 
 268.  See Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 6, at 957–58 (emphasizing the 
starkly different success rates of defendants and plaintiffs in civil rights disputes). 
 269.  See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 108–15 (discussing 
the “anti-plaintiff effect” in the appellate process of employment discrimination cases). 
 270.  Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 6, at 957–58. 
 271.  See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 16–17 (describing the overwhelming 
feeling of disappointment amongst plaintiffs who thought that either the whole legal system or 
specific aspects of the trial were biased against them). 
 272.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 117; see also NIELSEN ET AL., 
supra note 206 (noting that employment discrimination case filing peaked at 23,971 in 1997, 
declining to 14,353 in 2006).   
 273.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 118. 
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litigation process.
274
  Berrey and her colleagues interviewed a variety of 
parties involved in employment discrimination suits,
275
 including plaintiffs, 
defendants and employers.  While the law appears neutral, and indeed 
employment discrimination plaintiffs believe they are playing on an even 
playing field,
276
 the legal system actually favors those in power—meaning 
those with more resources and experience.
277
  As Berrey and her colleagues 
explain, “[p]laintiffs frequently narrate their experiences of the law as 
financially devastating, emotionally wrenching, and personally 
damaging.”278  Berrey and her colleagues also describe how both parties in 
an employment discrimination suit operate under the fiction that they are 
somehow on equal footing in a system in which the fact finder will decide 
the case on the merits.
279
  Instead, they found that reliance on this myth of 
fairness “can cloak the many ways in which employers actually shape the 
terms and outcomes of disputes.”280  Only three of the forty-one plaintiffs 




With experiences like those described above, it is little wonder that 
individuals who believe they are wronged by employment discrimination 
seek out alternative forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation or 
settlement.
282
  Mediation offers advantages in terms of party control, 
preserving relationships, and the possibility of creating win-win solutions, 
among other things.
283
  Arbitration is arguably quicker and less costly.
284
  
                                                          
 274.  See Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 15–18 (discussing plaintiffs’ 
“[d]ashed [h]opes for [f]airness” in the employment discrimination litigation context). 
 275.  Id. at 9–11 (describing the methods of the qualitative study). 
 276.  Id. at 18 (noting that most plaintiffs are optimistic “that the law could be a fair arbiter of 
their workplace disputes”).  
 277.  See id. at 8 (citing empirical research to illustrate that certain “structural features” of the 
American legal system “produce tangible material advantages for affluent defendants and 
corporate litigants”). 
 278.  Id. at 15. 
 279.  Id. at 12. 
 280.  Id.  One advantage employers have in these disputes is that the defendant has an easier 
time defending a claim than the plaintiff does pursuing a claim because defendants can rely on 
organizational supports and past experience to minimize the burdens of litigation.  Id. at 19.  In 
addition, the defendants’ representatives are not named in the lawsuit, thereby avoiding the 
personal hardships the plaintiff endures during the course of litigation.  Id. at 20.   
 281.  Id. at 26 (twenty-three were not at all satisfied and fifteen were ambivalent).  
 282.  See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982) 
(describing the many advantages of mediation over the adversarial system, namely that it is 
cheaper, faster, and more collaborative). 
 283.  See Harkavy, supra note 242, at 156–61 (detailing the advantages of mediation in the 
sexual harassment context). 
 284.  Moohr, supra note 266, at 403. 
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So, why do I insist on arguing in favor of trials in the face of these contrary 
realities? 
There are many arguments for why trials, and specifically jury trials, 
are good in this area of the law.
285
  Distinct problems emerge and are 
associated with each alternative dispute resolution mechanism, whether it 
be by settlement, arbitration, or an internal employer grievance 
mechanism.
286
  I will examine each of these approaches briefly, in the 
context of common arguments against different forms of alternative dispute 
resolution. 
One of the consistent criticisms of settlement derives from its 
confidential nature.
287
  Because most settlements require confidential terms 
and conditions, there is no way for the larger society to examine or judge 
whether the settlement is fair.
288
  Such settlements also provide no norm for 
future decisions, whether it be by judicial resolution or private settlements, 
about what is an appropriate amount of compensation for the injuries the 
defendant caused and the plaintiff incurred.
289
  Eventually, lawyers will not 
even know how to assess what is a fair settlement or how to value a case, 
because so few cases get to trial.
290
  This prevents a benchmark from which 
lawyers can bargain from evolving.
291
 
Instead of emphasizing what is fair compensation or a just resolution 
for plaintiffs, settlement involves a variety of extra-legal concerns.
292
  Marc 
Galanter emphasized how settlement occurs in the “‘shadow of the law,’”293 
meaning that, while settlements are inevitably influenced by legal 
                                                          
 285.  See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1075 (comparing settlement to “the civil 
analogue of plea bargaining”—consent is often coerced, the bargain may be drafted by someone 
without the proper authority, and justice may not generally be served by the process). 
 286.  Id. at 1076–85 (detailing how power imbalances, the absence of authoritative consent, 
and a lack of foundation for continuing judicial involvement plague the alternative dispute 
resolution realm). 
 287.  Id. at 1085 (noting that courts are “reactive institutions,” and thus the confidential nature 
of settlements do not properly allow courts to proceed with the development of the law). 
 288.  See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, at 693 (noting “[b]ecause we have virtually no 
information on how favorable settlements are for plaintiffs, this represents an enormous gap in our 
knowledge about discrimination litigation”).  
 289.  Luban, supra note 267, at 2653 (noting that discovery information can be of great public 
importance to litigators and the public good alike). 
 290.  See id. at 2651–58 (discussing the value of “sunshine laws” and their ability to create 
transparency in the judicial process). 
 291.  Id. at 2622 (describing how “court system[s] not only resolve disputes,” but they also 
create “rules and precedent”; private judges in contrast are “terribly inefficient producers of 
rules”). 
 292.  See generally id. at 2621–26 (comparing the public value of public adjudication with the 
public disservice of private dispute resolution). 
 293.  Galanter borrowed this phrase from Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser.  See 
Galanter, supra note 25, at 525 (citing Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 950). 
  
878 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:837 
standards, they also take into account “considerations of expense, delay, 
publicity and confidentiality, the state of the evidence, the availability and 
attractiveness of witnesses, and a host of other contingencies that lie beyond 
the substantive rules of law.”294  Owen Fiss specifically linked the 
considerations that go into settlement with the ideals of justice: 
The bargaining that normally takes place between litigants—
characterized . . . by the pursuit of self-interest, imbalances of 
material resources, inequalities of information, and strategic 
behavior—has no connection to justice whatsoever.  It is 
obviously not constitutive of justice, nor is it much of an 
instrument for achieving justice.  On occasion, bargaining might 
produce a just outcome, just as the judicial process might 
sometimes fail and produce an unjust outcome.  But there is no 
reason to presume that the outcome of the bargaining process—a 
settlement—is just.  All we can presume of a settlement is that it 
produces peace—often a very fragile and temporary peace—and 
although peace might be a precondition for the achievement of 
justice, it is not justice itself.
295
 
Clearly settlements do not necessarily lead to justice, which is a “public 
good.”296  Thus, when parties settle, “society gets less than what appears,” 
and justice may well not be done.
297
 
Richard Delgado takes this argument one step farther by positing that 
avoiding conflict in favor of cooperation, which is touted as one of the 
advantages specifically of mediation, is actually problematic: 
In a society like ours, conflict is normal, the ordinary state of 
affairs.  Our society is made up of competing classes in endless 
struggle: consumers and manufacturers; whites and the 
descendants of former slaves; workers and factory owners.  This 
conflict is normal, maybe even healthy.  Smoothing it over 
ignores something important.  And structuring a dispute 
resolution system so as to treat its every manifestation as a sign of 
unhealth is a very big mistake.
298
 
                                                          
 294.  Id. at 525–26.   
 295.  Fiss, History of an Idea, supra note 21, at 1277.   
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1085.  In his early work on the subject, Fiss 
was particularly concerned about the nature of consent in settled cases and the impact that a lack 
of resources might have on particular parties.  Id. at 1075–76.  Fiss concedes that resource 
imbalance can also influence outcomes in court but argues that the “guiding presence of the 
judge” may serve to “lessen the impact of distributional inequalities.”  Id. at 1077–78. 
 298.  Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 240, at 1401 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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Delgado’s article also notes that anger and indignation, clear characteristics 
of conflict, can fuel reform.
299
 
Commentators have likewise criticized settlements that involve courts, 
such as consent decrees or settlements of class actions.
300
  Fiss criticizes 
consent decrees because the judge never has the opportunity to hear the full 
story, unlike a trial.
301
  Thus, such decrees may not reflect the real factual 
background of the case or provide relief that reflects the actual harm.
302
  
Marc Galanter argues more generally that decisions become more detached 
from facts, or at least facts as brought out in the unique setting of a trial.
303
  
Galanter blames part of the rise of settlements on the expansion of 
managerial judging, whereby judges possess broad discretion to clear their 
dockets using whatever means at their disposal—including settlements.304  
In the 1970s and 1980s, judges added case management and mediation 
duties to their roles as  adjudicators.
305
  Galanter sees this increase of 
responsibility as a reflection of a wider shift in legal culture, that is, “part of 
a much broader turn from law, a turn away from the definitive 
establishment of public accountability in adjudication.”306  Indeed, he 
argues that the aversion to litigation also encompasses an “aversion to the 
determination of corporate accountability in public forums.”307  I find merit 
with this observation.  For example, in the context of employment 
discrimination, it is particularly objectionable for an employer to be called 
racist or sexist; having these cases decided outside the public sphere works 
to the advantage of employers in many ways.
308
  Owen Fiss also lauds the 
public dimension of adjudication, stating: 
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers 
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in 
                                                          
 299.  See id. (noting that conflict is the normal state of affairs in our society). 
 300.  Galanter, supra note 9, at 28.   
 301.  Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1083.  
 302.  See Galanter, supra note 9, at 28 (describing adjudication as a “spiral of attribution in 
which supposedly autonomous decision-makers take cues from other actors who purport to be 
mirroring the decisions of the former”). 
 303.  Galanter, supra note 25, at 530. 
 304.  Id. at 519–20.  
 305.  Id. at 520.  Galanter explains that “judicial ideology” is one factor influencing the long-
term decline of the trial: “The primary role of courts, in this emerging view, is less enunciating 
and enforcing public norms and more facilitating the resolution of disputes.”  Galanter, supra note 
9, at 16.   
 306.  Galanter, supra note 9, at 22. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE 
TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 197–200 (2005) (discussing reform efforts for 
sexual harassment law to reflect proper punishment and induce deterrence). 
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which the public participates.  These officials, like members of 
the legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has 
been defined and conferred by public law, not by private 
agreement.  Their job is not to maximize the ends of private 
parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give 
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the 
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring 




Even researchers who lament the treatment of employment 
discrimination claimants underscore that “settlements essentially buy 
employers out of trouble.”310  In the context of employment discrimination 
cases, this purchase relieves employers of an obligation or incentive to 
examine their workplaces and consider that there may be organizational 
structural components that permit discrimination to flourish.
311
 
The corporate desire to have cases heard outside of the legal system 
and to maintain employer control over the process is exhibited most vividly 
in the rise of employer grievance mechanisms for discrimination claims and 
the courts’ adoption of these mechanisms into the law itself.312  Lauren 
Edelman and her colleagues have accounted for the phenomenon of these 
employer implemented solutions to individual discrimination claims from a 
sociological perspective.
313
  Edelman and her colleagues applied the idea of 
legal endogeneity in this context, which posits that “the content and 
meaning of law is determined within the social field that it is designed to 
regulate.”314  In this specific context, the researchers trace the ascendency of 
internal grievance mechanisms from a supposition (largely unfounded at the 
time it was suggested) in the professional personnel literature that such 
grievance mechanisms would limit the liability of companies for 
employment discrimination to the adoption of such mechanisms as a 
defense to supervisor hostile environment claims.
315
  Note that there is no 
substantive link to eliminating discrimination; instead, employers 
                                                          
 309.  Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 21, at 1085.   
 310.  Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, supra note 174, at 26.  
 311.  See id. (stating that “[e]mployers’ assertions of unfair settlements maintain the myth that 
discrimination lawsuits are typically meritless”). 
 312.  Edelman, Uggen & Erlanger, supra note 107, at 412–14 (discussing the significant 
benefits, such as cost savings, available to organizations that institute internal grievance 
procedures). 
 313.  Id. at 408 (noting that their argument has typically been construed as institutionalist, 
however, they intend to prove that the “organizational ideologies of rationality induce the 
judiciary to incorporate grievance procedures into legal constructions of compliance with EEO 
law” (emphasis in original)). 
 314.  Id. at 407. 
 315.  Id. at 409.  
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developed these mechanisms largely to avoid liability.
316
  The interesting 
thing about these grievance mechanisms is that the courts accepted them as 
a solution to sexual harassment cases with little evidence regarding what, if 
any, type of system would remedy such discrimination.
317
  Criticism of the 
court’s reliance on internal grievance mechanisms has focused on both their 
efficacy as well as the social fact that most targets of sexual harassment do 
not complain using these systems.
318
 
Another advantage of trials is that they are public, which permits 
observation of and the ability to comment on the proceedings.
319
  With 
regard to the trend toward sending cases to arbitration, Texas state court 
judges Craig Smith and Eric Moyé lament the loss of the public nature of 
trials, arguing: 
Our civil justice system is an open court system, where public 
and private disputes are resolved in transparent proceedings.  This 
system “ensures that the people . . . benefit from a full public 
airing of the issues, and it allows innovations and solutions 
learned from today’s cases to help resolve tomorrow’s 
disputes.”320 
Delgado also argues that adjudication allows society to confront new 
issues directly, rather than having to resolve them in “[i]nvisible, back-
                                                          
 316.  See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of 
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 13–25 (2001) (discussing how anti-
discrimination training programs were designed to help avoid or reduce employer liability); 
Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 17–21 (2003) (explaining how the human 
resources community quickly embraced both the Faragher and Ellerth decisions in crafting 
“recipe[s] for legal compliance,” which employers consequently incorporated into their workplace 
structures); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 126, at 980–1010 (discussing the prevalence of litigation 
prevention advice and legal compliance strategies). 
 317.  See Martha S. West, The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call For Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
457, 461–62, 467–68 (2002) (discussing how women are reluctant to report harassment); BEINER, 
supra note 308, at 158–61 (discussing that victims of harassment rarely report it as required by 
Ellerth/Faragher standard for imputing liability to employers for supervisors of sexual 
harassment); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 316, at 29–44 (addressing the pitfalls of anti-discrimination 
training); Grossman, supra note 316, at 41–49 (discussing the efficacy of employer prevention and 
training efforts). 
 318.  BEINER, supra note 308, at 159–66 (describing studies suggesting victims rarely report 
sexual harassment). 
 319.  See Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. 
STUD. 627, 629–30 (2004) (explaining how the O.J. Simpson trial increased public consciousness 
by “illuminat[ing]” the “vast gulf between African Americans and whites about the fairness of” 
the criminal justice system). 
 320.  Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 297 (quoting Wallace B. Jefferson, The State of the 
Judiciary in Texas, 70 TEX. B.J. 314, 314 (2007)). 
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room negotiation.”321  Others link this public aspect of trials to storytelling.  
Describing trials as “one of the few official forums for story telling[,]” Paul 
Butler asserts that “[w]ith fewer trials, we lose some public stories, and 
their official morals (i.e., verdicts).”322  This phenomenon can thus lead to 
public uncertainty about the law as well as societal mores.
323
 
This loss of certainty in the law is particularly profound in 
employment discrimination cases, an area of law in which the public, 
through its legislators, has pronounced its support for equality of treatment 
at work.
324
  As employment discrimination is less overt in modern times, it 
becomes difficult for the public to know when it actually occurs.
325
  This 
difficulty is especially problematic in harassment cases, in which the fact 
finder uses a “reasonable person” standard to determine whether the 
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable.
326
  How is an 
employer or employee supposed to know what reasonable people believe if 
so few cases are decided by juries?  It is little surprise that one of the 
common complaints with respect to sexual harassment law is that 
employers and employees alike do not know what it is.
327
  Public trials 




Paul Butler argues that jury trials also have value as a reflection of 
democracy because jurors reflect the diversity of American citizens.
329
  He 
posits, however, that just as juries have become increasingly more 
diversified, trials have simultaneously begun to vanish; he argues this could 
be viewed as a form of white flight from the legal system similar to that 
                                                          
 321.  Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 240, at 1405. 
 322.  Butler, supra note 319, at 634. 
 323.  See id. (noting that when the public does not have access to facts and must collect these 
facts from several venues—as opposed to one—it creates confusion and uncertainty).  
 324.  See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95 (2003) (explaining 
that legislators enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “as part of a social movement 
against discrimination in all aspects of life,” including equal treatment in employment). 
 325.  See id. at 99–108 (discussing the structural and organizational changes in the workplace 
that have impacted the way in which discrimination operates in this context in the wake of Title 
VII’s passage). 
 326.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 327.  BEINER, supra note 308, at 15; Grossman, supra note 316, at 40. 
 328.  BEINER, supra note 308, at 15–16 (discussing how few sexual harassment cases are 
decided by jury verdicts, leaving employers and the public guessing as to what constitutes 
actionable sexual harassment). 
 329.  Butler, supra note 319, at 632–34 (arguing that diversity of jurors is one of many 
intangible benefits of trials). 
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which occurred after school desegregation.
330
  Another benefit to trials is 




Fiss sees trials as embodying public principles that go beyond the 
particular dispute between the parties. In his later work on his concerns 
regarding fewer trials, Fiss argued that adjudication is meant to produce just 
outcomes, and society loses this when parties decide to settle.
332
  As he sees 
it, “[j]ustice is a public good, objectively conceived, and is not reducible to 
the maximization of the satisfaction of the preferences of the contestants, 
which, in any event, are a function of the deplorable character of the options 
available to them.”333 
Studies suggest that employment discrimination plaintiffs have more 
success before juries than judges; as Clermont and Schwab note, 
employment discrimination plaintiffs win at trial less than other plaintiffs 
overall.
334
  Win rate differentials lessen considerably, however, for jury 
trials.
335
  The comparison between employment discrimination plaintiff 
wins before juries and wins before judges is telling.  In their study of trials 
between 1979 and 2006, they found that plaintiffs win 19.62% of bench 
trials compared with 37.63% of jury trials.
336
  As Clermont and Schwab 
opine, “it may be that trial judges are more demanding of plaintiffs than 
                                                          
 330.  Id. at 632; see also Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 240, at 1406 (arguing that 
ADR is favored by Republican business leaders because it sidetracks disputes by those who 
should be fighting, including civil rights claimants); Galanter, supra note 9, at 20–21 (explaining 
that “large sections of business, political and legal elites embraced a set of beliefs and 
prescriptions about the legal system that, for want of a name, I have called the ‘jaundiced 
view’”—in this view, “trials are not only expensive, but are [also] risky because juries are 
arbitrary, sentimental, and ‘out of control’”). 
 331.  Butler, supra note 319, at 634.  In their interviews with employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, Berrey and her colleagues noted that almost half “stress[ed] that, even if they lost their 
cases, they are glad they pursued the case” and spoke of “‘fighting’ for justice.”  Berrey, Hoffman 
& Nielsen, supra note 174, at 17. 
 332.  Fiss, History of an Idea, supra note 21, at 1277 (“All we can presume of a settlement is 
that it produces peace—often a very fragile and temporary peace—and although peace might be a 
precondition for the achievement of justice, it is not justice itself.”). 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 129 (ranging from 28.47% for 
employment discrimination plaintiffs as compared with 44.94% for other plaintiffs). 
 335.  Id. at 130 (noting that employment discrimination plaintiffs win jury trials 37.63% of the 
time as compared with 44.41% for other plaintiffs).   
 336.  Id. (reviewing data from 1979 to 2006).  The gap between win rates closed some at the 
end of the study period, but a disparity remains.  See id.  Nielsen and Nelson also note similar 
findings for data from 1990 to 2001, with plaintiff success rates during this period ranging from 
36% to 44% before juries and from 14% to 33% before judges.  Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 4, 
at 698.  
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juries are, or at least are exhibiting a well-founded fear that appellate judges 
are more likely to reverse judgments for plaintiffs.”337 
Arbitration of employment discrimination claims has its own set of 
problems, including the often-cited “structural advantage” employers have 
as “repeat players.”338  Employers are advantaged in a system they use 
often, while employees, who are often only one-time players, are at a severe 
disadvantage in terms of experience.
339
  In addition, because arbitrators 
often see the same employers, they have a financial incentive to rule in the 
employers’ favor so that those employers will continue to choose them to 
arbitrate their next case.
340
  There is also a lack of fairness with regard to 
employment arbitration clauses, which are generally presented to 
employees as “take it or leave it” provisions341 that they must accept if they 
want the job or, in some cases, to continue in their jobs.  Smith and Moyé 
argue that this façade of cooperation is not the type of arm’s length 
bargaining that those who drafted the FAA envisioned for enforceable 
arbitration clauses.
342
  Smith and Moyé note that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v Jackson,
343
 permitting arbitrators to 
determine even the issue of the unconscionability of the employment 
contract,
344
 only makes the apparent conflict for arbitrators worse in these 
cases.
345
  As they further explain, “[t]his effectively gives the arbitrator the 
discretion to decide whether or not he or she has authority to perform a task 
that he or she will receive income for completing, thus creating an inherent 
                                                          
 337.  Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 6, at 131.  They also note that in 
certain types of cases lawyers rely on misperceptions about the sympathies of judges versus juries.  
Id. at 130–31. 
 338.  Green, Measures to Encourage, supra note 266, at 65 n.31 (citation omitted); see also id. 
at 67–69 (discussing the various disadvantages both employers and employees must confront in 
the arbitration context). 
 339.  See Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 298 (“Because [larger corporate parties] arbitrate 
repeatedly, they benefit from increased familiarity with the arbitrators as well as the arbitration 
process.  This pattern also creates a potential for arbitrators to act in a manner inconsistent with 
the neutrality that is critical to the fairness and effectiveness of the arbitration process.” (internal 
citation omitted)).  
 340.  See id. (identifying that this phenomenon is known as “repeat player bias”). 
 341.  See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 
705–20 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing in detail the many criticisms of the 
unfair nature of arbitration clauses). 
 342.  See Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 287 (noting that Congress intended the FAA to 
apply to contracts between parties at arm’s-length and not to parties with unequal bargaining 
power).  Another effect of enforceable arbitration clauses is that a person must “yield his or her 
very access to the courts in order to meaningfully participate in our modern society.”  Id. at 282.  
 343.  130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
 344.  Id. at 2779–81. 
 345.  Smith & Moyé, supra note 106, at 293–94 (stating that this decision may also result in an 
increase in the number of gateway issues, like unconscionability, going to arbitrators).  
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and untenable conflict of  interest.”346  The result, from these two judges’ 




IV.  CONCLUSION 
The courts appear eager to find other arenas where employment 
discrimination plaintiffs can resolve their claims.  In light of this trend, 
employment discrimination plaintiffs would be rational to pursue other 
remedies outside the legal system, and, indeed, the latest data suggest they 
are beginning to abandon the federal adjudicatory system.  Alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, however, may not offer the panacea 
employment discrimination plaintiffs seek, given that there is no way of 
knowing whether settlements, resulting from mediation or otherwise, are 
indeed just.  Much of my analysis regarding problems in the court system 
would not be possible if the courts did not issue written decisions that are 
subject to public scrutiny.  I would not be able to argue, for example, that 
the Court’s interpretation of the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with 
respect to arbitration is wrongheaded without those public decisions to 
reference.  With many employment discrimination cases settling, there is 
simply no way to determine if justice is truly being done.  While settlement 
may provide plaintiffs with more control over the outcome, there is no way 
to criticize the current system unless some brave plaintiffs bring their cases 
to court. 
The impact of resolving these cases “in the shadow of the law” goes 
beyond simply whether a given settlement or arbitration result is just.  
Society loses the opportunity to condemn employer practices that it 
considers discriminatory as well as to participate in the public debate that 
occurs in court cases about what is appropriate behavior in the workplace.  
In the context of harassment cases, in which the standard is based on the 
“reasonable person,” jury input on what the average person would find 
harassing would help develop not only appropriate standards for court 
determinations, but also appropriate standards for workplace conduct that 
employers might implement.  Society loses something in both the 
                                                          
 346.  Id. 
 347.  See id. at 295 (stating that the judicial interpretation of the FAA, creating in effect a 
“classwide” arbitration scheme, is responsible for this erosion of the right to a jury trial (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 301 (classifying blanket enforcement of arbitration agreements as 
effectively “assault[ing]” the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial); see also Jean R. 
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a 
Jury Trial, 16 OH. ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 674–75 (2001) (explaining “[m]ost courts have not 
directly confronted the tension between the cases governing jury trial waivers and those governing 
arbitration clauses” because courts have not been presented with these particular issues). 
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development phase as well as the outcome phase when these decisions are 
not public.  Perhaps most importantly, we, the public, lose the opportunity 
to see just what is going on in modern workplaces and therefore cannot 
evaluate and condemn the widespread discriminatory practices that remain. 
So, in the end, I find myself arguing in favor of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs bringing their cases in the federal court system.
348
  
While the system is currently not operating in an ideal manner, this 
circumstance is cause to suggest reform—not abandonment. 
                                                          
 348.  I also believe that some state court systems are more hospitable to claimants.  While my 
emphasis here has been on the federal court system, in part because there is more data on the cases 
litigated in this forum, the state court systems offer the same public benefits that the federal court 
system provides.  
